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Chapter 1
Summary & Introduction
This thesis consists of four papers, two of which I have written jointly with Mich
Tvede and two of which I have written on my own. Let me first try to explain
the background for my results and my motivation for choosing the papers I have
included. Instead of summarizing each paper individually, I will try to put them
into a context I find natural.
This thesis has as its main subject the theory of General Equilibrium (GE).
GE has as its main object the study of markets, our behavior as traders and the
impact on welfare. To start with the last word, equilibrium, we are concerned with
behavior and prices that are invariant, in the sense that traders cannot improve
upon their personal welfare by exchanging commodities on the market at the going
prices. Implicitly this implies that non-equilibrium states are uninteresting and
unimportant! As scientists we try to find systematic and persistent patterns, and
non-equilibrium behavior must by definition be unsystematic and change as time
passes by. The first word, general (as opposed to partial), emphasises that we are
concerned with several markets - and not just a single market. One can, in some
sense, say that we are concerned with a closed system, i.e., a system which does
not receive impulses from external and unexplainable sources. All changes must be
explained by modeled phenomena.
The majority of analyses on GE has thus far been focused on
• Existence, i.e., does stable states exist?
• Determinacy, i.e., if stable states exist, how many different stable state does
our theory predict? and
• Efficiency, i.e., how desirable is the stable states?
These are of course important and interesting questions, and we shall address some
of them in this thesis. However, one message I would like to promote is that general
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equilibrium analysis is more than these issues. I would like to emphasise that a GE
analysis is essential in understanding the interrelation between the financial markets
and the real economic decisions, such as consumption, savings and investments.
Maybe too much energy has been put into the extension of results concerning the
above mentioned categories, while other issues have been neglected.
My thesis concern general equilibrium with a special emphasis on the financial
markets. Up until the late 1950’s the financial markets were considered as just
merely another market and encompassed into the theory of Arrow and Debreu (see
[4] and [18]). They reduced the theory of financial markets to a one-shot game, where
financial contracts were perfect contingencies on either commodities or income. This
implied that the theory of financial markets fitted perfectly into the existing theory,
and moreover, the efficiency issues were then solved: financial markets admitted
efficient allocation of risk and savings decisions, and economic policy decisions were
reduced to distributional considerations. These were just applications of the funda-
mental theorems of welfare economics and showed the advantages of the abstract
approach. The consequence was also that either people could trade only initially,
and then let the contingent contracts execute the subsequent trades, or they could
transfer income using simple contracts and then trade on spot markets. Both meth-
ods produced the same result. A third result was then directly reusable, namely that
such trades and prices constituting an equilibrium always existed, which guarantees
that if the world approximately is as assumed in the model, then it makes sense to
analyze such states. If the existence was not generically guaranteed, then it would
be like King Arthur and his knights’ search for the Holy Grail.
However, in the mid 1970’s a branch of GE emerged, which showed that the
issue of efficient risk allocation was not solved yet (see [35], [53] just to mention
a few references). The point is that financial markets are not perfect in the sense
that not all people are capable of obtaining full insurance, even if they can meet
the repayments requested by the insurance company. Thus, people might be credit
constrained. This can be attributed to asymmetric information which implies that
lenders are reluctant to lend money to borrowers, since the borrower cannot credibly
convenience the lender that he will be able to repay the loan. Examples of this are
the well-known moral hazard and adverse selection problems. This problem can
partially be solved by the use of collateral, but this requires a sufficiently developed
legal system. Also, the existing model assumed that the cost of trading in itself
was either negligible or non-existing. The branch was later referred to as GEI -
General Equilibrium of I ncomplete financial markets. Within GEI the issue of why
asset markets are incomplete is in general not treated, but the existing assets are
taken as part of the fundamentals of the economy, and not a variable that agents can
2
Chapter 1
influence. Assuming that all existing securities are essential1, generically, the models
cannot explain why some assets are not traded, i.e., why the market breaks down,
and why others are. There are some different theories on financial innovation [2]
and collateral [26] addressing this issue, just to mention some few. However, we will
stay in the realm of GEI and take the financial structure as given. Also, GEI only
considers perfectly competitive behaviour, i.e., the hypothesis that traders and the
households act as if they them self have a neglect able effect on the aggregate terms
and, thus, take the prices and behaviour of other agents as given. This is of course an
abstraction in many cases, but nevertheless it provides a good framework of analysis
since it provides us with a benchmark case. Moreover, we do not consider the case
of asymmetric information and thus the prices’ role as signals and aggregator of
information.
Generally, the exchange of commodities between individuals occurs either due
to differences in preferences, endowments, or beliefs. This also holds within the
financial markets, where we often label these causes as insurance and saving. While
many authors have emphasized the importance of informational costs and value
(see e.g. [5]), i.e., the costs related to acquiring information relevant to forming
expectations and verifications, we emphasise the importance of transaction costs,
in particular on the financial markets. A fundamental contribution in the general
equilibrium literature of transaction costs was by [33], showing the first general
existence theorem in an economy with transaction costs. We shall analyse such
economies and the consequences of transaction costs more closely. Moreover, we
depart from [33] in the existence result by considering intermediation costs, i.e.,
costs that are not based upon any use of real resources in the process of transactions.
The financial markets are an important part of an economy and its ability to
function properly. Whether it is insurance against fire, accidents, theft, unemploy-
ment, sickness or disability, or it is the provision of company’s financial foundation
- financial markets provide these services. Since these markets are so vital for the
economy, it is important to understand and comprehend the functioning of these
markets in order to determine the right policies and design of the institutions under
which the financial markets operate.
We shall be concerned with two subjects:
• Implications of transaction costs on equilibrium states
• Volatility and incomplete financial markets
1Loosely speaking, a security is essential if its payoffs cannot be generated by any other com-
bination of securities.
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1.1 Implications of transaction costs on equilib-
rium states
First, we are concerned with the implications for the equilibrium states that emerge
as we introduce transactions costs on the financial markets. This is the subject of
the articles “On Financial Equilibrium and Intermediation costs”2, Chapter 2 and
“The Existence of a Free Lunch, Equilibrium in Income Streams, and Intermediation
Costs”, Chapter 4.
Transaction costs are the wedge between the revenue of the seller and the ex-
penses of the buyer. A transaction cost which everybody knows of is the exchange
rate gap, i.e., the difference in the buying- and selling-price of exchange agencies.
Another example is the interest gap of banks, i.e., the gap between the loan- and the
borrowing-rate. However, these are only the “visible” transaction costs. Also, the
costs of obtaining the required information of assessing the value of an asset, and
the actual cost of actually obtain the required portfolio, are examples of transaction
costs. Again, we take the particular form of transaction costs as exogenous given.
A particular form of transaction cost is merely a redistribution of income in that
the real costs associated with the transaction is zero. An obvious question is then
why such institutions might exist, since they do not perform any socially productive
function. We do not address this question, but an obvious reason could be monopoly
power, resulting either from scale effects in production or publicly supported licenses
limiting the competition. More general transaction costs are associated with bring-
ing the two parties to a deal together, i.e., matching of traders, and also payments
to market makers, i.e., agents who guarantee a sufficient liquidity in the market.
Obviously, transaction costs make insurance and saving more expensive and must
hence by that measure be bad. However, they may have an advantage, namely
that they restore the existence property. It was shown (see [35]) that existence of
equilibrium was not guaranteed when traders were allowed to go short, which in some
situations could affect prices in such a manner that the asset market was no longer
durable. Examples have shown that this is a robust property when derivative assets
are included in the set of essential securities. The consequence of transaction costs
is to reduce this tendency to sell short assets, and thereby to reduce the effect on
prices of asset markets. This guarantees the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Also, we show that small changes in the transaction costs do not change the resulting
equilibrium, as long as they are positive. Having showed existence of equilibrium
states with transaction costs, we turn to the question of how these equilibrium states
may look. An interesting question is whether free lunches, i.e., costless profits, are
2Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008.
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consistent with competitive equilibrium states. In particular, we ask the following
questions
• Can there exist unexploited, free lunches?, and
• Can free lunches be exploited in equilibrium?
Without transaction costs the answer is negative for both of these questions. How-
ever, when transaction costs are present and they are strictly convex, i.e., the
marginal transaction cost increases with increasing trade, then the answer is af-
firmative to both questions. With imperfect competition the first is valid, while
the second is invalid. With irrational traders both questions, again, are answered
affirmative, however, our results are true even with rational traders. Our results in-
dicate that it’s necessary condition that traders are sufficiently diverse in their need
for income transfers, and that simple, representative consumer economies cannot
capture such phenomena. Moreover, the income distribution influence the likeli-
hood of exploited free lunches, the more income inequality; the more likely it is that
free lunches can be exploited in equilibrium.
1.2 Volatility and incomplete financial markets
Since the first testable models of asset pricing emerged, an ever lasting question has
been whether the competitive hypothesis and no-arbitrage principle can explain the
asset prices and predict trade in securities. Also, the securities markets have been
almost exploding in size, both the number of securities and the volume of trade,
also relatively to the total income of the society. It is difficult to understand this
using the basic Arrow-Debreu model which should place the responsibility for this
in the preferences of the households and their need for income transfers. However,
we offer different explanations:
• the design of the securities and/or
• the liberalization of financial markets.
Since the early 80’s the financial markets have experienced a huge increase in the
different types of securities available to be traded. In particular, the securities
referred to as derivative securities3 have emerged and their usage has exploded.
While most critics have focused on the complexness and opaqueness, and hence the
3They have been named so because their dividend is derived from other (primary) securities.
Examples of such securities are options on stocks and CDO (Credit Derivative Options) used by
banks to trade credit risk.
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difficulties of correctly valuing the security, we do not address this problem regardless
how relevant it might be. Alternatively, we suggest that, if the derivatives are
essential in the risk dispersion, it is the feedback between the underlying prices and
their risk characteristics which is problematic. Secondly, we argue that additional
to the direct effect of liberalization on the financial markets making trades less
expensive, the indirect effect of changing future equilibrium prices can, potentially,
have a very large effect.
Basically, we have four important conclusions:
• Asset prices can jump without the underlying fundamentals changing signifi-
cantly when the asset market is incomplete,
• Asset trading can be arbitrarily large, even with complete markets,
• Liberalization of asset markets can explain an arbitrary large increase in the
asset trading, and
• The presence of derivative assets mitigates the above stated results.
The three last results are included in the paper “Volatility of Security Trade
and Incomplete Financial Markets”, Chapter 3, while the first is in “Jumps in As-
set Prices: A General Equilibrium Explanation, Chapter 5. The first considers a
Ramsay-model, with uncertainty and heterogeneous consumers, financial markets
and intermediation costs in an infinite-horizon economy. The emphasis in this pa-
per is on the volume of trade and its relation with changing transaction costs and
security design. The latter paper considers a finite-horizon economy and analyses
the asset prices. It shows that the prices with incomplete financial markets can
be subject to discontinuous jumps as the fundamental characteristics change by in-
finitely small changes. We show that with complete markets these jumps cannot
occur, and hence we conclude that this is a way of testing whether financial mar-
kets are incomplete. However, the test can only falsify that markets are complete,
since incomplete markets are only a necessary condition to obtain the discontinuity.
Moreover, our example shows a multitude of different equilibria and hence an inde-
terminacy of the resulting equilibrium states. This is obtained even with real assets,
thus contrasting the general result in the case of a finite set of states of nature.
The result suggests that there is a qualitative difference between Radner equilibria
in the finite and in the continuum case, and hence that the finite case is a poor
approximation of the continuum case. Our results further show that the occurrence
of a sudden large drop in asset prices cannot per se indicate whether there has been
a bubble or not. Also, the “thick tails” of asset price distributions observed in data
can be explained by our result.
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Thus, the two papers analyse the financial markets with different focuses, either
volume of trade or asset prices.
1.3 Conclusion
One of the conclusions that I want to emphasise is that general equilibrium anal-
ysis matters, illustrated by the paper “Volatility of Security Trade and Incomplete
Financial Markets”. Here, one of the necessary conditions for the results is the
interplay between markets, namely the feedback of income exchanges and relative
commodity prices on the opportunities of risk diversion.
A main hypothesis in microeconomic theory is that the world is populated by
diverse agents, having different and divergent interests, and that these conflicting
interests are the engine of the phenomena that we observe in the world. The results
of the paper “The Existence of a Free Lunch, Equilibrium in Income Streams, and
Intermediation Costs”, Chapter 4, illustrate how this diversity is needed and is
automatically assumed away in models of representative households economies.
I hope that the conclusions of this dissertation can contribute to the growing
literature which illustrates that general equilibrium theory does not solely consist
of existence results. I think that several economists have abandoned the GE due to
the large focus on these perhaps inferior questions.
I would like to emphasise that we have not made any welfare conclusion, in
particular, we have not concluded that transaction costs are neither positive nor
negative. Here we have to take two effects into account each point in two different
directions. Firstly, transaction costs are inefficient in that they prevent trades of
income which would otherwise take place, beneficial for each two parties. However,
this cannot, in general, lead us to the conclusion that in the absence of transaction
everybody is better of. Here the theory of second-best comes into the picture, since
the case of no transaction costs is in general inefficient, and price effects might
decrease someone’s welfare. Second, transaction costs re-establish the existence of a
competitive equilibrium, but in order to assess the benefits of this we need a theory
of what is happening when no competitive equilibrium exists.
Moreover, we cannot conclude whether the existence of arbitrage opportunities
and exploration of these are socially costly.
A central part of economic activity is not represented in the papers constituting
this dissertation, and this is production, i.e., the transformation of commodities into
other commodities taken into its most broad definition. There are several reasons
why production has been left out. Firstly, we do not think the inclusion of production
would change our qualitative results, since the mechanisms yielding our result are not
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mitigated by firms. Second, introducing firms requires that we choose an objective
on which the firms take decision to maximize. This is in general not obvious how this
objective should be formed when the financial markets are incomplete. When the
security markets are incomplete firms not only transform commodities, but they can
further transform income streams and hence their decisions affect society’s ability to
allocate risk. When the owners of a company differs in their evaluation of risk this
role plants a seed of disagreement between owners which the markets cannot remove
(for a more thorough treatment of the firm in GEI see [21]). An inclusion would
thus require a decision on the objective of the firm which is undecided theoretically
yet, without contributing significantly. Third, much of the literature on GEI has
thus far ignored the firm.
An important question which we have left unanswered is the nature of transac-
tion cost and thus also what properties it has. An important property is that as the
volume of trade increases infinitely the transaction costs also go to infinity. This
is probably not controversial. However, the convexity assumption which is funda-
mental in the result of chapter 4, is obviously controversial. It exclude the case of a
fixed fee and constant marginal costs.
8
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On Financial Equilibrium and
Intermediation Costs
Tobias Markeprand
Abstract. This paper studies the set of competitive equilibria in financial economies
with intermediation costs. We consider an arbitrary dividend structure, which in-
cludes options and equity with limited liabilities. We show a general existence result
and upper-hemi continuity of the equilibrium correspondence. Finally, we prove
that when intermediation costs approach zero, unbounded volume of asset trades is
a necessary and sufficient condition, provided that, there is no financial equilibrium
without intermediation costs.
JEL classification:. D41; D52; D53;
Keywords:. Incomplete Markets, Intermediation Costs, General Equilibrium The-
ory
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2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the properties of the set of competitive equilibria when inter-
mediation costs are present. We allow the asset structure to include non-linear
dependence on spot market prices. We show that every economy has a competi-
tive equilibrium and that the equilibrium correspondence parameterised by the cost
function and endowments is upper-hemi continuous. Further, when the intermedia-
tion costs go to zero and no equilibrium exists without intermediation costs in the
economy, the asset trades are unbounded. The results are due to a boundary on
asset trades induced by the intermediation cost, which is assumed to go to infinity
when the volume of asset trades goes to infinity.
We consider a two-period model with S different states. In each period-state,
spot trading of goods takes place and asset trading takes place in the first period
before uncertainty is revealed. Trading in asset markets is costly due to intermedi-
ation costs, and the revenues from these trades are redistributed to the consumers1.
This could be in proportion to some pre-specified fraction.
The global existence property arises from the presence of intermediation costs.
Non-existence, when such costs are not present, arises from the discontinuity of
demand for assets when commodity prices converge to prices for which the dividend
matrix drops in rank. The presence of intermediation costs prevents the drop in
rank from inducing discontinuity of the demand correspondence.
This paper extends the existence result in [52] to a more general asset structure
and intermediation cost function. The result in Pre´chac concerns real assets that
depend linearly on the commodity prices, and with dividends that are positive.
However, this excludes important classes of assets like options, futures etc. We
obtain the stronger result by imposing more restrictions on the cost function. In
Pre´chac, intermediation cost depends on the value of the trades and not on the
volume of trade. Hence, if the asset price is zero, the cost is zero. When an asset
yields dividends with different signs in different states, the price might be zero in
equilibrium. The existence result is then obtained by assuming that the dividends
are strictly positive. The issue of continuity of the equilibrium correspondence is
not addressed by Pre´chac.
Initially, existence results in financial economies with incomplete markets were
established by [53]; here an exogenous boundary on asset trades was imposed. Later,
[35] showed that this boundary assumption was essential for the existence result,
providing an example in which no financial equilibrium existed when the boundary
1Therefore, it is an intermediation cost rather than a transaction cost. We prefer to distinguish
between the two, since the latter is a real cost that arises in the exchange of commodities, while
the former is a transfer of income between agents.
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assumption was dropped. Both contributions considered an asset structure that
depended linearly on commodity spot prices. In relation to these results, [24] showed
that the non-existence of equilibrium is a non-generic property: a small perturbation
of the economy will re-establish the existence of equilibrium. However, this result
was due to the linearity of the dividends’ dependence on spot market prices as shown
in [51]. They provide an example involving options, which gives rise to a robust
non-existence of financial equilibrium. As showed in [11], robust non-existence of
competitive equilibrium can also arise in economies when preferences are not strictly
convex.
It is from this perspective the existence result of this paper should be viewed.
Pre´chac shows existence when asset structure is linearly dependent on spot market
prices and positive dividends, while in this paper we only assume continuity. This
comes at the expense of more restrictions on the cost function. However, our result
allows asset structures with nominal and real assets including options.
Let us briefly suggest an interpretation of our results. If we consider the com-
petitive equilibrium a reasonable description of the state of the economy, then non-
existence of equilibrium implies that prices cannot coordinate the actions of the
agents. With robust examples of non-existence, such situations occur with nonzero
probability. The results of this paper imply that these problems disappear when
trade on financial markets is costly, even though the revenue from such costs is
transferred back to the agents. Intuitively, the upper hemi continuity implies that,
even though the agents make small mistakes in their assessment of the character-
istics of the economy, the error in the expectation of prices and allocation will be
small.
The paper will proceed as follows: In section 2.2 we formalise the model and
present the results. Section 2.3 contains the proofs of the results.
2.2 The Model
We consider a two-period model with H, a finite set of consumers, and S, states
of nature, to be revealed in the second period. We denote by s a generic state and
take, due to ease of notation, s = 0 as the first period. In each state and period
there are L perishable goods and hence the commodity space is RL(S+1). We denote
by P ⊂ RL(S+1)+ the space of spot market prices2. There are J assets represented by
2Notation: Given x, y ∈ Rn, we write x ≥ y iff. xi ≥ yi for i = 1, ..., n, x > y iff. x ≥ y and
x 6= y. This further gives us the sets Rn+ = {r ∈ Rn | r ≥ 0} and Rn++ = {r ∈ Rn | r  0}. We
denote by δi = (0, .., 1, ..., 0) ∈ Rn the vector in Rn which is 0 on all coordinates expect in the
i’th coordinate, where it is 1. Given a normed vector space X, we denote by O(x) the open ball
with radius  > 0 and centre in x ∈ X. The set of all subsets of a set X is denoted 2X and if
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a dividend structure V : P → L(J, S)3 representing the space of income transfers.
A portfolio is denoted by z ∈ RJ while q ∈ Q ⊂ RJ denotes an asset price vector.
Denote by (uh, ωh, Xh) a consumer with utility function uh, initial endowment of
commodities ωh ∈ RL(S+1) and consumption possibilities set Xh ⊂ RL(S+1). We
denote by Ω ⊂ RHL(S+1) the set of endowments.
Consider a function c : RJ × RJ → R such that c(q, z) ≥ 0 is the intermediation
cost of obtaining the portfolio z = (zj)
J
j=1 ∈ RJ given asset prices q = (qj)Jj=1 ∈ RJ .
We denote by C the set of intermediation cost functions, i.e., costs by trading in the
asset market in excess of the linear cost given by the price per unit.
Given spot market prices p = (p(s))Ss=0 ∈ P , asset prices q ∈ RJ and a transfer
w ∈ R+, the budget set Bh(p, q, w) of consumer h is the set of commodity bundles
x = (x(s))Ss=0 ∈ Xh and portfolios z ∈ RJ , such that
p(0) · x(0) ≤ p(0) · ωh(0)− q · z − c(q, z) + w
and for every s = 1, ..., S,
p(s) · x(s) ≤ p(s) · ωh(s) + Vs(p) · z
We denote by
φh(p, q, w) = (φ
x
h, φ
z
h)(p, q, w) = arg sup{uh(x) | (x, z) ∈ Bh(p, q, w)}
the demand correspondence of consumer h. We shall sometimes denote the demand
correspondence of h by φh(p, q, w;ω, c) when we want to emphasise the underlying
economy (ω, c) ∈ Ω× C.
We now define our equilibrium of this economy (ω, c) ∈ Ω × C, taking the in-
termediation cost function as given. It is a pair of commodity and asset prices, an
allocation of commodities and portfolios, which are maximal for each consumer, each
market clears and the revenue from the asset trades are distributed to the consumers
by lump-sum transfers:
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium of (ω, c) is
a tuple (p, q, x, z), such that there exists w = (wh)h∈H satisfying the following con-
ditions:
1. (xh, zh) ∈ φh(p, q, wh) for every h ∈ H
2.
∑
h∈H xh − ωh = 0
X = RN , then we write 2N . If X =
∏
i∈I Xi, then we denote by proji : X → Xi := (xi)i∈I 7→ xi,
the projection map.
3L(J, S) is the space of linear mappings RJ → RS .
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3.
∑
h∈H zh = 0
4.
∑
h∈H wh =
∑
h∈H c(q, zh)
Denote by E(ω, c) the set of such tuples (p, q, x, z), where there exists a competitive
equilibrium.
Let Z = RL(S+1)×RJ × (RL(S+1)×RJ)H , then E(ω, c) ⊂ Z for every (ω, c) ∈ Ω×C
and we shall refer to E : Ω× C → 2Z as the Equilibrium correspondence.
Assume next that the following conditions are satisfied:
Assumptions. Given the economy (H,RL(S+1), (uh, ωh, Xh)h∈H , V, c) we assume
that
1. ωh ∈ intXh for every h ∈ H
2. Xh = RL(S+1)+ is closed, convex and bounded from below
3. uh : Xh → R is continuous, quasi-concave and strictly monotone
4. V : P → L(J, S) is continuous
5. c : Q× RJ → R+ is continuous and c(q, 0) = 0 for every q ∈ Q
6. if λ > 1 then c(q, λz) ≥ c(q, z) for every z ∈ RJ for every q ∈ Q
7. for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and z, z′ ∈ RJ we have c(q, λz + (1− λ)z′) ≤ λc(q, z) + (1−
λ)c(q, z′) for every q ∈ Q
8. c(q, ejλ)→∞ whenever λ→∞ for every q ∈ Q and j = 1, ..., J
We denote by C the subset of C(RJ×Q) with the compact-open topology, which
satisfies the assumptions4. We note that C is not complete since 0 ∈ C \ C. In
particular, this implies that any convergent sequence in the subspace C must have
a limit point that is different from the zero function. Hence, C is a convex cone
pointed at 0, which is not closed.
Remark 1 We note that continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences imply
the following property: for every x ∈ Xh there exists ε > 0 and y(0) − x(0) ∈ RL+
such that for every (y(s))Ss=1 with ‖(x(s)− y(s))Ss=1‖ < ε implies that u(y) > u(x).
Dividend structures satisfying the assumptions include the following types:
4A sequence {fn} converges to f in the compact-open topology if and only if for every K ⊂
RJ compact and every  > 0 there exists N ≥ 1, such that for every n ≥ N we have that
supx∈K |fn(x)− f(x)| < . According to [46], this space is metrizable, separable and complete.
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1. V (p) = V (p′) for every p, p′ ∈ P .
2. Consider the matrix R ∈ RSL such that the dividend matrix V (p) is given by
Vs(p) = p(s) · Rs = Vs(p(s)), where p(s) ∈ RL+ is the commodity price vector
of state s, while Rs ∈ RL is a commodity bundle.
3. As in the above example, but letting p¯(s) = ( pl(s)
pl(0)
)Ll=1 (when p  0), we have
that Vs(p) = p¯(s) ·Rs.
4. Considering an asset r1 = (rs(p(s)))
S
s=1 with r(·) continuous, then letting an
asset having the dividend vector given by r2(p) = (max{k − rs(p(s)), 0})Ss=1
for some k ≥ 0, we have that V (p) = (r1(p), r2(p)) satisfies the assumptions.
Thus, the dividend structure includes securities such as nominal assets (i.e.,
bonds and Arrow securities), contingent contracts on commodity bundles, options
and equity contracts with limited liabilities.
The last assumptions concern the properties of the intermediation costs: we
assume that the costs are non-negative, increasing and zero if the asset trades are
zero. Further, if the volume of asset trades goes to infinity, the costs go to infinity.
Finally, the costs behave continuously in both asset prices and trades. An example
of a cost function that satisfies these assumptions is the following: Let cj, kj > 0 for
j = 1, ..., J , then
c(q, z) = α
J∑
j=1
cj|qjzj|n + β
J∑
j=1
kj|zj|m
for every n,m ∈ N satisfies the assumptions when α, β > 0. An example of a cost
function that does not satisfy the assumptions is
c(q, z) =
{
0 z = 0
αq · |z|+ F z 6= 0
for some α, F > 0, since it violates the continuity and convexity property in z = 0.5
Our main result is that under our maintained assumptions, every economy pos-
sesses a competitive equilibrium and the equilibrium correspondence is (upper-hemi)
continuous:
Theorem 1 For every (ω, c) ∈ Ω× C we have E(ω, c) 6= ∅.
Proposition 2 E : Ω× C → 2Z is upper-hemi continuous.
The difficult part is to show that the intermediation costs induce an endogenous
boundary on the optimal portfolio choice. We do this by showing that arbitrary small
5With |z| = (|z1|, ..., |zJ |).
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changes in future income can be converted into infinite positive income in the present
period. Thus, arbitrary small changes in future consumption, by continuity and
strict monotonicity of preferences, we can compensate the consumer by increasing
the present consumption.
Further, consider a sequence cn ∈ C with cn → 0 and E(ω, 0) = ∅. The non-
existence of equilibrium must imply the need for income transfer when costs ap-
proach zero and hence a positive demand for assets - the discounting of future state
income must differ across consumers. But then as the cost function is -distance
from the zero function for  > 0 small enough, there exists some positive amount of
trade and as  tends to zero, the asset trades go to infinity.
Proposition 3 Assume that E(ω, 0) = ∅, cn ∈ C, cn → 0 and (pn, qn, xn, zn) ∈
E(ω, cn), then for every M ≥ 0 there exists N ≥ 1 such that if n ≥ N then
‖zn‖ > M .
In the example of [51], these results imply, that when intermediation costs on
asset trade are positive, there exists a competitive equilibrium. However, as this
cost goes to zero, the volume of asset trade goes to infinity.
Remark 2 We note that E(ω, 0) ⊂ E(ω, C) for every ω ∈ Ω. Thus, it is possible to
construct an intermediation cost function that satisfies the conditions of continuity,
convexity etc., while still obtaining the competitive equilibrium without intermedi-
ation costs. The point is to tax only those asset trades whose volume exceeds the
equilibrium asset trade. The inclusion holds for every ω ∈ Ω by the convention
∅ ⊂ A for any set A.
2.3 Proofs of the Main Theorems
Before giving the proofs, we define the sets used in this section. We denote by
D =
S∏
s=0
Ps ×Q =
S∏
s=0
{p(s) ∈ RL+ |
L∑
l=1
pl(s) = 1} × {q ∈ RJ | max
j
|qj| ≤ 1}
the price space and
M(ω) = {x ∈
∏
h∈H
Xh |
∑
h∈H
xh − ωh = 0}
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the set of market equilibria of commodity allocations. A summary of the sets is:
RL(S+1) The commodity space
Ω ⊂ RHL(S+1) The set of endowments
X =
∏
h∈H Xh The set of allocations
M(ω) The set of spot market clearing allocations
D ⊂ RL(S+1) × RJ The set of normalised spot and asset prices
Z = D ×X × RHJ The set of prices, allocations and portfolios
C ⊂ C(Q× RJ) The set of intermediation cost functions
For every n ∈ N, let En = (ω, c)n ∈ Ω× C be the restricted economy with
Bnh(p, q, w;ω, c) = Bh(p, q, w;ω, c) ∩ projhM(ω)× [−n, n]J
φnh(p, q, w;ω, c) = arg sup{uh(xh) | (xh, zh) ∈ Bnh(p, q, w;ω, c)},
being the restricted budget and demand correspondences of consumer h ∈ H.
2.3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We now state and prove a theorem similar to [53], stating that every bounded
economy contains an equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Given n ∈ N, assume that φnh is upper-hemi continuous, non-empty and
convex-valued for every h ∈ H. Then there exists (pn, qn, xn, zn) ∈ E(En).
Proof:
Define µ0 by
µ0(x¯, z¯) = arg max
(p,q)∈D
∑
h∈H
p(0) · (x¯h(0)− ωh(0)) + q · z¯h,
and let µ1 be given by
µ1(x¯, z¯) =
(
arg max
(p,q)∈D
p(s) ·
∑
h∈H
x¯h(s)− ωh(s)
)S
s=1
.
Note that the correspondence is well-defined since the maxima used in µ0 and µ1
are independent. Let then µ be given by
µ(x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) = µ0(x¯, z¯)× µ1(x¯, z¯)×
(∏
h∈H
φnh(p¯, q¯, w¯h)− (ωh, 0)
)
,
with w¯h = pih
∑
k∈H c(q¯, z¯k) for some pih > 0 and
∑
h∈H pih = 1.
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Assume that (p¯, q¯, x¯, z¯) ∈ µ(p¯, q¯, x¯, z¯), then we have that∑
h∈H
p¯(0) · (x¯h(0)− ωh(0)) + q¯ · z¯h ≥
∑
h∈H
p(0) · (x¯h(0)− ωh(0)) + q · z¯h,
for every (p(0), q) ∈ P0 ×Q and using the budget constraints∑
h∈H
p¯(0) · (x¯h(0)− ωh(0)) + q¯ · z¯h = 0, (2.1)
which implies that ∑
h∈H
p(0) · (x¯h(0)− ωh(0)) + q · z¯h ≤ 0.
Since δ0l ∈ D for all l = 1, ..., L, we have that
∑
h∈H x¯h(0) − ωh(0) ≤ 0 and∑
h∈H z¯h ≤ 0. Also, we have that −δj ∈ Q such that
∑
h∈H z¯h ≥ 0, implying that∑
h∈H z¯h = 0. Further, we have that∑
h∈H
p¯(s) · (x¯h(s)− ωh(s)) ≥
∑
h∈H
p(s) · (x¯h(s)− ωh(s))
for every p(s) ∈ Ps, but then since p¯(s)·(x¯h(s)−ωh(s)) = Vs(p¯)·z¯h and
∑
h∈H z¯h = 0,
we have that
∑
h∈H p(s) ·(x¯h(s)−ωh(s)) ≤ 0. Again, this implies that
∑
h∈H x¯h(s)−
ωh(s) ≤ 0 for every s = 1, ..., S. By monotonicity, we have that
∑
h∈H x¯h(s)−ωh(s) =
0 for every s = 0, 1, ..., S.
By standard arguments, the correspondence µ is upper-hemi continuous, non-
empty, convex-valued mapping a non-empty, convex and compact subset of an Eu-
clidean space into itself. Thus, according to [1] there exists some e¯ ∈ µ(e¯).

Remark 3 Note that we only need L(S + 1)− (S + 1) price variables to obtain an
equilibrium, and not L(S + 1) − 2, which is standard when the asset structure is
not real. Hence, we can restrict ourselves to price systems that have positive spot
prices in each state. This prevents examples of budget correspondences which are
not lower-hemi continuous as was the case with the example given in [28, section 4].
Next, we show that there exists an equilibrium for the original economy, i.e.,
that the optimal asset trades must be bounded:
Lemma 2 Let (pn, qn, xn, zn) ∈ E(En) be an equilibrium for every n ∈ N, then
there exists some (p, q, x, z) ∈ E(ω, c), which is a cluster point of the sequence
(pn, qn, xn, zn)n∈N.
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Proof:
Consider a sequence of equilibria (pn, qn, xn, zn) with wnh = pih
∑
h∈H c(q
n, znh),
where pi ∈ RH++ and
∑
h∈H pih = 1. Since (p
n, qn, xn)n∈N ⊂ D ×M(ω), there exists
a convergent subsequence and by passing to this subsequence we can assume that
(pn, qn, xn)→ (p, q, x) ∈ D ×M(ω).
Assume that limn→∞ ‖zn1 ‖ = ∞. Then by market clearing we can assume that
limn→∞ ‖zn2 ‖ =∞. But since limn→∞ |wn1−qn ·zn1 −c(qn, zn1 )| <∞ and limn→∞wn1 =
∞, we must have that limn→∞ qn · zn1 + c(qn, zn1 ) =∞.
Given the sequence (zn1 )n∈N, define z˜
n
1 = (1 − λ)zn1 for some λ > 0. Then for
every n ∈ N,
−qn · z˜n1 − c(qn, z˜n1 ) ≥ −qn · zn1 − c(qn, zn1 ) + λ(qn · zn1 + c(qn, zn1 )),
by convexity of c(q, ·) and c(q, 0) = 0, and thus for every λ > 0,
lim
n→∞
wn1 − qn · z˜n1 − c(qn, z˜n1 ) ≥ lim
n→∞
λ(qn · zn1 + c(qn, zn1 )) + p(0) · (x1(0)− ω1(0))
= ∞.
Thus, we have obtained a portfolio that yields infinitely (in the limit) more income
in the first period. Let (x˜n1 )n∈N ⊂ X1 be a sequence satisfying x˜n1 (s) = (1− λ)xn1 (s)
for s = 1, ..., S and n ∈ N. Then limλ→0 x˜n1 (s) = x1(s) for every s = 1, ..., S, n ∈ N
and
pn(s) · (x˜n1 (s)− ω1(s)) = Vs(pn) · z˜n1 .
But x˜n(0) can be chosen arbitrarily for n large enough. By using the result in remark
1, we obtain the desired contradiction, since u1(x˜
n
1 ) > u1(x
n
1 ).
Since the sequence (pn, qn, xn, zn) is bounded, we have that there exists some
m ∈ N, such that for every h ∈ H
arg max{uh(xh) | (xh, zh) ∈ Bmh (p, q, wh)}
= arg max{uh(xh) | (xh, zh) ∈ Bh(p, q, wh)},
since Bn2h () ⊂ Bn1h () for every n1 > n2.
Hence the sequence (pn, qn, xn, zn) must contain a convergent subsequence, but
then the cluster point (p, q, x, z) of this sequence is an equilibrium of E : the market
clearing conditions are obviously satisfied and the constraint on the revenue from
intermediation costs also. Thus, we need to show that (xh, zh) ∈ φh(p, q, wh). As-
sume that (x′h, z
′
h) ∈ Bh(p, q, wh) and uh(x′h) > uh(xh). Then given (pn, qn, wnh) →
(p, q, wh), there exists by lower-hemi continuity of Bh(·) a sequence (x¯nh, z¯nh) ∈
Bh(p
n, qn, wnh) such that (x¯
n
h, z¯
n
h) → (x′h, z′h); but then there exists some N ≥ 1
such that for every n ≥ N we have that uh(x¯nh) > uh(xnh) by continuity of uh, a
contradiction.
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
In order to apply the maximum theorem, we need the following result that the
budget correspondence Bnh is continuous, non-empty and convex-valued for every
consumer h and every n ∈ N:
Lemma 3 The correspondence Bnh(ω, c) : D × R+ → 2X × 2J given (ω, c) ∈ Ω × C
is continuous, non-empty and convex-valued for every n ∈ N.
In the proof we omit sub- and superscripts indices of the consumers h, and we
show the lower-hemi continuity of the original correspondence Bh.
Proof:
Non-emptiness and convexity is obvious.
Upper-hemi continuity: Since Bn(p, q, w) have values in a compact space, this
is equivalent to the closed graph property. Consider a sequence (pm, qm, wm) →
(p, q, w), (xm, zm) ∈ Bn(pm, qm, wm) and (xm, zm)→ (x, z). But then we have that
pm(0) · xm(0) + qm · zm + c(qm, zm) ≤ pm(0) · ω(0) + wm
pm(s) · xm(s) ≤ pm(s) · ω(s) + Vs(pm) · zm
for every m ∈ N and taking limits, these inequalities are preserved, i.e., (x, z) ∈
Bn(q, p, w).
Lower-hemi continuity: Consider (x, z) ∈ B(p, q, w) and a sequence (pm, qm, wm)→
(p, q, w). If p(0)·x(0)+q·z+c(q, z) < p(0)·ω(0)+w, then there exists someN ≥ 1 such
that for every m ≥ N we have that pm(0) ·x(0)+qm ·z+c(qm, z) < pm(0) ·ω(0)+wm.
Thus consider the sequence
(xm(0), zm) =
{
(ω, 0) m ≤ N
(x(0), z) m > N
If on the other hand p(0) · x(0) + q · z + c(q, z) = p(0) · ω(0) + w, then since
p(0) · ω(0) + w > 0, there exists (x′, 0) ∈ RL × RJ such that for some N we have
that m ≥ N implies
pm(0) · x′ < pm(0) · ω(0) + wm.
Since the map (x(0), z) 7→ pm(0) · x(0) + qm · z + c(qm, z) is continuous, for every m
there exists (xm(0), zm) such that
pm(0) · xm(0) + qm · zm + c(qm, zm) = pm(0) · ω(0) + wm,
and (xm(0), zm)m∈N can be chosen to converge to (x(0), z).
By the s = 1, ..., S budget constraints, we let
tm(s) =
pm(s) · ω(s) + Vs(pm) · zm
pm · x(s) ,
19
Chapter 2
such that limm→∞ tm(s) = 1 by continuity of V (·). Hence we have found a convergent
sequence (xm, zm) ∈ B(pm, qm, wm) with (xm, zm)→ (x, z) ∈ B(p, q, w).

This concludes the proof of theorem 1: by lemma 1 there exists for every bounded
economy market clearing prices, allocations and portfolios maximising utility. By
lemma 2 there exists a boundary on allocations and portfolios due to intermediation
costs. By lemma 3 the budget correspondence is continuous, non-empty and convex
valued, which implies that the demand correspondence is upper-hemi continuous
and convex-valued and thus the conditions of lemma 1 are satisfied and the result
of theorem 1 is proved.
2.3.2 Proofs of Proposition 2 and 3
In order to apply the maximum theorem to the demand correspondence, we need to
know the continuity property of the budget correspondence wrt. the space of cost
functions: To obtain the result of upper-hemi continuity of φh, we use the maximum
theorem (see [1]) extended to general topological spaces due to the fact that C is
not a subspace of any Euclidean space.
Lemma 4 Given (p, q, w) ∈ D×R+, the correspondence Bh(p, q, w;ω, ·) : C → 2X×
2J is continuous.
In the following, we denote B(c) = B(p, q, w;ω, c) for every (p, q, w) ∈ D × R+ and
(ω, c) ∈ Ω× C, and omitting the prescript h.
Proof:
It is easy to see that B has a closed graph: since if cn → c and (qn, zn)→ (q, z)
then cn(qn, zn) → c(q, z) by uniform convergence6. Since cn → c, we have that if
(x, z) ∈ B(c), then limn→∞ p(0) · (x(0)− ω(0)) + q · z + cn(q, z)− w = 0 and hence
for every  > 0 there exists δ > 0, such that if c′ ∈ Oδ(c)∩C then B(c′) ⊂ O(B(c)).
Consider now an element (x, z) ∈ B(c) and a sequence (cn) such that cn →
c. We look for a sequence (xn, zn) ∈ B(cn) such that (xn, zn) → (x, z). Take
(xn, zn) = arg d((x, z), B(cn))7. But convergence in the compact-open topology
implies pointwise convergence in every compact subset. Taking the compact set
containing (ω, 0) and the sequence (xn, zn), we have that d((x, z), B(cn)) → 0 and
hence limn→∞(xn, zn) = (x, z).

6The evaluation map (c, (q, z)) 7→ c(q, z) is continuous.
7Where we have that d(x,A) = infa∈A ρ(x, a) in any metric space X with metric ρ and A ⊂ X
closed.
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Note that as a corollary to the lemmatas 3 and 4, the correspondence B : D ×
R+ × Ω× C → 2X × 2J is continuous in the product topology of D × R+ × Ω× C.
As a corollary to the proof in lemma 2, we have that the set of equilibria is
bounded given any intermediation cost function.
Lemma 5 Let (ωn, cn)→ (ω, c) then ⋃n∈NE(ωn, cn) is bounded.
Proof:
Indeed, every E(ωn, cn) is bounded. By assuming that there exists zn, such that
‖zn‖ → ∞ and replicating the argument in the proof of lemma 2, we obtain a
contradiction.

The equilibrium set is bounded:
Lemma 6 E(ω, c) is compact for every (ω, c) ∈ Ω× C.
Proof:
Since E(ω, c) is bounded, we can restrict the demand correspondences without
changing the set of equilibria. But then φmh : D × R+ → 2L(S+1) × 2J is upper-
hemi continuous. But then if (pn, qn, xn, zn)→ (p, q, x, z), (pn, qn, xn, zn) ∈ E(ω, c),
we have that (xnh, z
n
h) = φ
m
h (p
n, qn, wnh) → φmh (p, q, wh) = (xh, zh) and the market
clearing conditions are satisfied. Thus (p, q, x, z) ∈ E(ω, c).

This induces that the equilibrium correspondence is upper-hemi continuous in
the endowment space, since given any sequence the equilibrium set
⋃
n∈NE(ωn, c
n) is
contained in a compact subspace and hence the closed graph property is equivalent
with upper-hemi continuity.
Proof: [Proof of Proposition 2]
Since {E(ωn, cn)}n∈N is contained in a bounded set of Z, there exists a convergent
subsequence (pn, qn, xn, zn) of selections in E(ωn, cn), but then by upper-hemi conti-
nuity of φh(·), we have that (xh, zh) ∈ φh(p, q, w;ω, c) and hence (p, q, x, z) ∈ E(ω, c).

This gives us the result of proposition 2: by lemma 4 the budget correspondence
is continuous in Ω×C; hence by the Maximum Theorem the demand correspondence
is upper-hemi continuous.
Next we prove proposition 3.
Proof: [Proof of Proposition 3]
Using the result of [53], we have that if ‖z‖ ≤ L for all z then E(ω, 0) 6= ∅, thus
implying that if E(ω, 0) = ∅ then for any allocations of commodities and portfolios
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(x, z) such that
∑
h∈H xh−ωh = 0 and
∑
h∈H zh = 0 and prices (p, q) with (xh, zh) ∈
Bh(p, q, wh;ωh, 0), there exist (x
′, z′) and h with uh(x′h) > uh(xh) and (x
′
h, z
′
h) ∈
Bh(p, q, wh;ωh, 0). Assume that there exist M ≥ 0 such that supn ‖zn‖ ≤ M ; let
(pn, qn, xn, zn) ∈ E(ω, cn) be a convergent (sub)sequence with limit (p, q, x, z) ∈ Z,
then we have that
0 =
∑
h∈H
xh − ωh
0 =
∑
h∈H
zh
(xh, zh) ∈ Bh(p, q, wh;ωh, 0),
(the last inclusion follows from the closed graph property of the budget set) but
then there exists (x′, z′) and h ∈ H such that uh(x′h) > uh(xh) and (x′h, z′h) ∈
Bh(p, q, wh;ωh, 0); then by continuity of uh there exists some δ > 0 such that for
every x¯h ∈ Xh with ‖x¯h − x′h‖ < δ implies that uh(x¯h) > uh(xh). Since cn → 0,
there exists some N ≥ 1 such that for all n ≥ N we have that Bh(pn, qn, wnh ;ωh, cn)∩
Oδ(x
′
h, z
′
h) 6= ∅, but then (pn, qn, xn, zn) cannot be an equilibrium since h can obtain
higher utility and can therefore not maximise utility.

2.4 Final remarks
In this paper we have proved the existence of equilibrium in financial economies when
intermediation costs are present. We have shown that the equilibrium correspon-
dence mapping cost functions into prices, allocations and portfolios is upper-hemi
continuous. Also we have shown that if the cost function converges to the zero
function, then the portfolios of the agents must diverge and hence are unbounded.
The assumption of strict monotonicity is obviously very restrictive, and the proof
also shows that a less restrictive condition could be imposed and our result would
still hold. However, this would be less standard and would not provide considerably
new insights.
We could extend the existence result to cost functions that are non-convex and
semi-continuous when considering large economies. However, as the proof is con-
structed, this would require a condition that implied that the reduction in interme-
diation cost due to some small fraction would not be zero. It is easy to see that a
two-part tariff with positive marginal costs would satisfy this condition.
In this paper we have considered intermediation costs on the net asset trade. We
note however that the result is easily extendable to the case where intermediation
costs are on sale and purchase of the same asset.
22
Chapter 3
Volatility of Security Trade and
Incomplete Financial Markets
Tobias Markeprand & Mich Tvede
Abstract. In the recent decades the ratio between the volume of trade in securities
and income has increased dramatically. We show that this increase can be explained
in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets and intermediation
costs. The model is a stochastic version of a multi-agent Ramsey model with sta-
tionary fundamentals of an exchange economy. We show that the effect of financial
liberalizations on the trading volume is potentially very large. Further, we show how
the changes in the dividend structure can explain both an increase in the volume
and volatility of trade. This can happen even though the risk dispersion offered
by the market is unchanged. These results can only occur in economies where the
financial market is (potentially) incomplete, whose dividends depend on endogenous
variables such as e.g. prices.
JEL classification:. D41; D52; D53; G11
Keywords:. Incomplete markets, General Equilibrium, Volatility, Portfolio Choice.
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3.1 Introduction
Empirical studies have shown that the volatility of stocks has been increasing during
the period from mid 70’s until today (see [57]). The volume of trade on NYSE has
increased almost monotonically throughout the decade 1990-1999 by an annually
instantaneous rate of 16 %, while the number of trades has increased by almost
22 %. In the same period the GDP of the US has increased annually by 2.7 %.
And the same pattern is observed throughout a large part of the world. During
this period the main trend of public policy of financial regulation has been that of
deregulation, and hence has decreased the costs of trading securities. Here we show
that the high volume of trade can be explained by a decrease in the intermediation
costs. While this might not seem too surprising, we claim that the observed increase
in trades is not only the direct effect of a decrease in the trading costs. We also
need to take into account the indirect equilibrium effects (and thus basically we
justify a general equilibrium approach). The indirect effect goes as follows: when
intermediation costs decreases, asset and commodity prices change current, as well
as future, prices. These changes in prices (and price expectations) result in changed
securities’ returns, such as options, stocks, etc. If these induced changes in the
dividend reduce the risk dispersion of a current portfolio, the traders need to trade
more intensive in order to obtain the same risk profile. In this paper, we show that
this effect can be very large and, potentially, without boundary. Thus, high volume
of trade and volatility is not necessarily due to irrational noise traders but can be
explained in a perfectly rational model!
We consider the following model: Assume that the fundamentals are stationary
Markov processes, where the fundamentals are the initial endowments, the security
dividends and the consumer preferences. Formulated differently, the economy is
subject to random shocks which are independent and invariant over time. No pro-
duction takes place and the only economic activity is the exchange of a perishable
good and of short-lived securities with a zero net supply. The dividend of each secu-
rity can depend upon the realisation of future security prices. A departure from the
traditional finance models, trading securities is subject to an intermediation cost.
There is a finite set of households each with an infinite lifespan. The consumer’s
utility satisfies the independence axiom and the von-Neumann Morgenstern utility
is bounded away from the boundary. Households are, in addition to the usual in-
tertemporal budget constraint, subject to a transversality condition using their own
present value vector. This prevents Ponzi-game schemes, i.e., financing debt with
increasing debt into the indefinite future. In short, our model is a stationary version
of [43] with the addition of intermediation costs and price dependent dividends.
Let us relate this paper to the more general discussion on financial volatility
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and efficiency of the financial markets. The main point of the market efficiency
hypothesis is that the price of an asset equals the present value (using an appropriate
discount factor) of the future dividends. More specifically, the discount rates are
martingales, i.e., the expected value is equal to the current value. One might be
more correct in labeling this hypothesis the market information efficiency, since
it does not tell us anything about the (Pareto) efficiency of the allocation of real
goods like savings and investment. It only implies that it is not possible to obtain
any arbitrage on the financial markets, i.e., there is no free-lunch. We shall not
challenge the efficient market hypothesis here. However, we do allow the financial
markets to be incomplete, such that not all risk profiles are tradable on the financial
markets.
Much of the finance literature has focused on the pricing of securities, rather
than the volume of trade. However, let us briefly discuss some contributions on
volatility of security prices which we find relevant. They are relevant in that their
models are within the same framework as ours. Also, the volume of trade and
price changes are not independent, empirically according to [39], [50] where volume
and prices are positive correlated, and theoretically [56] where rational traders,
due to informational asymmetries, use trading volumes to interfere information and
hence volume affects prices. In this way prices and volume of trade are intimately
related. In [3] incomplete financial markets, or more specifically, limited market
participation is also related to excess volatility of asset prices. They attribute this
to liquidity trade, i.e., a sudden need of cash and the sale of securities in order
to meet such needs, and limited market participation. A model like [20] is used
and this opens up for self-fulfilling expectations in the decision of participation on
the security market, which is subject to a fixed entry cost: If investors expect small
participation rates, future security markets will be sensitive to liquidity trade, which
can discourage investors from paticipating on the security market. Instead they use
the liquid cash as means of saving. [17] studies volatility of security prices and
financial innovation. Their results point in two directions, depending on the nature
of risk, more specifically whether there is aggregate risk or not. When there is no
aggregate risk, completing the asset market will generically reduce the asset price
volatility. While in the case of aggregate risk, reducing the degree of incompleteness
per se is not necessarily associated with a volatility reduction. We take the financial
structure as exogenous. These are only two examples and many more could have
been added.
Let us try to justify our introduction of intermediation cost on asset trading.
Presumably the best known example of an intermediation cost is known as bid-ask
price spreads, i.e., the difference between the prices that financial institutions buys
assets from costumers and the price that they sell the assets at. Every person who
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has travelled from one currency area to another knows that the exchange of money
in itself cost money. Also, trading on a stock exchange is subject to a trading cost
net of the price of a stock. Thus, they do exist! We defer further discussion to
section 3.7.
The outline of the paper is as follows: in section 3.2 we formulate the model and
introduce the relevant concepts. In section 3.3 we state our main results. In section
3.4 shows the model formulated in income streams. This formulation in income
streams illustrates how examples of non-existence of equilibria can exist. The point
is that the model is equivalently formulated as portfolio choices and asset prices
as to income stream choices through the achievable income streams generated by
portfolio choices. The section shows that non-existence of an equilibrium is indeed
a sufficient condition but not a necessary condition. In section 3.5 we show the
existence of an ergodic equilibrium in any economy with positive transaction costs.
In section 3.6 we also give specific examples of economies and their equilibria. Using
the terminology of income spaces we obtain a wide range of economies where the
volume of trade is boundless as the intermediation costs goes to zero. Finally, in
section 3.7 we conclude and comment on the results and assumptions.
3.2 The Model
Time goes from t = 0 to ∞, thus t ∈ N0. In each period there is a single perishable
consumption good and k shot-lived purely financial securities, i.e., with a zero net
supply. Let there be n agents each living infinitely. No production takes place and
the only available resources are the initial endowments of the consumption good.
Let Y be a finite set of shocks and pi : Y → P (Y ) a transition map, i.e., given a
state y, pi(y) is a probability distribution on Y and pi(y, y′) ≥ 0 is the probability
that the next state is y′ conditional on y. We assume wlog that for every y′ ∈ Y
there exists y ∈ Y such that pi(y, y′) > 0, i.e., no state is superfluous.
Agent i evaluates any consumption stream x = (xt)t∈N0 which is uniformly
bounded, where xt is a random variable with values in R+ and distribution µ, by
using the real-valued map
Ui(x) = E[
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(xt)] =
∫ ∑
βiiui(xt) dµ(x),
where ui : R+ → R is a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and βi is the
discounting rate. For any T denote by
UTi (x) = E[
T∑
t=0
βtiui(xt)],
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the “cut-off”-utility or T -horizon utility of some consumption stream.
We take the consumption space to be the set of uniformly bounded R+-sequences,
i.e., X = `∞(Y ) = {(xt)t∈N0 | supt ‖xt‖ < ∞} where xt : Y t → R+ is the consump-
tion at date t contingent on the history (yτ )τ≤t.
Assume that the assets are short-lived with return D(y, q)θ ∈ R in state y if the
portfolio θ ∈ Rk is held from the previous to the current period and the current
asset price vector is q. We assume that D(y, q) ≥ 0 for every y ∈ Y , q ≥ 0. Let
Θ = {(θi)ni=1 ∈ Rnk |
n∑
i=1
θi = 0}
be the set of market clearing portfolio (spot) allocations. Given a portfolio θ, let
c(θ) ∈ R+ be the intermediation cost of this portfolio. We assume that c(·) is
continuous, convex, c(0) = 0 and lim‖θ‖→∞ c(θ) = ∞. Denote by C the set of
intermediation cost functions endowed with the compact-open topology.
We take the portfolio space to be the set of uniformly bounded Rk-sequences, i.e.,
Z = `∞(Rk) = {(zt)t∈N0 | supt ‖zt‖ <∞} where zt : Y t → Rk is the consumption at
date t contingent on the history (yτ )τ≤t.
Note that the securities here are in zero net supply, and thus there is no aggregate
accumulation of wealth in the economy. Thus, in a particular equilibrium path an
individual can be rich, but this accumulation of wealth of a single individual must
be offset by a equivalent accumulation of debt by other consumers.
The reason why we choose short-lived securities, is threefold: first, they suite the
stationary environment well, and second any finite-lived security structure would be
no obstacle only more cumbersome notation, and finally, as shown in [44] with
zero net supply of securities the model permit speculative bubbles, i.e., the price
of a security can deviate from the fundamental value. Also, it eases the notational
difficulties.
Each agent has an endowment ei : Y → R++ of consumption goods and an initial
endowment of assets ξi ∈ Rk such that
∑
i ξi = 0. Assume that ei(y) +D(y, q)ξi > 0
for every y ∈ Y and q ≥ 0.
A financial economy with intermediation costs is characterized by the following
information
E = (pi,D, c, (ei, ui, βi, ξi)ni=1),
and sometimes just E = (e,D, c), when the remaining characteristics are fixed.
Note that for any intermediation cost function c ∈ C and D the set of economies is
parametrized by a finite dimensional vector space RI#Y .
Assume that limx→0 ui(x) = −∞ and limx→∞ ui(x) <∞, i.e., the von-Neumann
Morgenstern function is bounded from above and boundless from below. This as-
sumption implies the existence of a “reservation” consumption level given r > 0,
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xi(r) > 0 such that
ui(xi(r)) +
βi
1− βiui(r) ≤
1
1− βi miny∈Y {ui(ei(y))} (3.1)
i.e., the consumer prefers the initial endowment in all periods to consuming x today
and the maximal consumption r in all of the future periods. This property imposes
a lower bound on consumption allocations which can arise in equilibrium.
The endogenous state space is
Z = Θ×Θ× Rn+ × Rk × Rn+.
A generic element is denoted by (θ−, θ, x, q, w), where θ− ∈ Θ is the portfolio al-
location from the previous period, θ ∈ Θ is the current portfolio, x ∈ Rn+ is the
allocation of consumption goods, q ∈ Rk is the asset prices and w ∈ Rn+ is a transfer
to each agent redistributing the revenue from intermediation costs. Then the state
space is
S =
{
(y, (θ−, θ, x, q, w)) ∈ Y × Z |
∑
i xi − ei(y) = 0∑
i c(θi)− wi = 0
}
. (3.2)
For an S-valued finite horizon stochastic process (st)
T
t=1 (on some unspecified prob-
ability space) we write st = [yt, (θ
−
t , θt, xt, qt, wt)] = [yt, zt]. We call such a process
(st)
T
t=1 a consistent state process provided that, for alle t < T , the conditional distri-
bution of yt+1 given s1, ..., st is almost surely pi(yt), i.e., Prob{yt+1 = y | s0, . . . , st} =
pi(yt, y) for every y ∈ Y 1. A sequence (at)t∈N0 of random variables (on the same
probability space on which (st) is defined) is adapted to (st)t∈N0 if at is (s1, ..., st)-
measurable2 for all t ∈ N0.
Henceforth, we shall write (x, θ) = (xt, θt)t∈N0 , when there is an infinite sequence
of random variables.
Definition 2 (Feasible Strategy) Given a state process (st)t∈N0, a feasible strat-
egy for agent i is an (st)-adapted process (θ, x) satisfying, for all t,
qt · θt + xt = ei(yt) +D(yt, qt)θt−1 − c(θt) + wit
almost everywhere with θ0 = ξi and such that
lim
T→∞
E[βTi u
′
i(xiT )(qT θiT + c(θiT )− wT ) | s1, . . . , st] = 0.
almost every where for every t = 0, 1, . . . .
1See e.g. [22], section 10.
2The σ-algebra generated by the functions (s1, ..., st) is finer than the σ-algebra generated by
at.
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The first condition is referred to as the intertemporal budget constraint while the
second is referred to as the transversality condition. The transversality condition
guarantees that the agent does not enter into a Ponzi-game scheme. This condition
is not necessary in [23] since the portfolios are uniformly bounded by definition.
This boundary implies that the transversality condition is automatically satisfied.
The transversality condition implies that the sequence of portfolios must have a
boundary on the growth of wealth. While the concept of transversality is maybe
hard to accept due to its lack of economic content, however, as showed in [43] any
equilibrium with transversality constraints is equivalent to an equilibrium with debt
constraints. This last concept may be more acceptable from an empirical point
of view. However, it does not fit well into the competitive framework and the
anonymity of markets. The point of their result is that the Ponzi-game condition
is self-imposed using the transversality condition, i.e., if I do not think anyone is
willing to accept a Ponzi-game strategy then it is not optimal for me to engage into
a Ponzi-game scheme.
Note further that imposing the transversality condition implies that the budget
constraint could be transformed into a single with the requirement that income
transfers should be in the market space. However, we have chosen the form above
as this is a minimum of modification relative to [23].
Definition 3 (Optimal Strategy) An optimal strategy given (st) for i is a feasi-
ble strategy (θ, x) such that, for any other feasible strategy (θ′, x′), we have Ui(x) ≥
Ui(x
′).
Let us next introduce some central concepts of dynamic systems.
Consider a Borel space S of states3, referred to as the state space. Denote
by P (S) the set of measures on S. A transition map is a measurable set J ⊂
S and a measurable map Π: J → P (J) such that Π(s) ∈ P (J) for every s ∈
J . An equilibrium correspondence is a correspondence G : S → P (S), where for
every s ∈ S the set G(s) ⊂ P (S) is the set of probability measures µ on S which
are compatible with temporary equilibrium conditions. We also refer to G as an
expectations correspondence, when it has a closed graph. A measurable set J ⊂ S
is self-justified (wrt. G) if J 6= ∅ and G(s)∩ P (J) 6= ∅ for every s ∈ J . A transition
map (J,Π) is a (homogenous) Markov equilibrium (wrt G) if Π(s) ∈ G(s) for all
s ∈ J , i.e., if any initial state in J is mapped into an equilibrium measure on J .
Given a transition map (J,Π), a measure µ is invariant if for every measurable
subset A ⊂ J we have that
µ(A) =
∫
J
Π(s, A) dµ(s),
3A complete, separable, metric space equipped with the Borel σ-algebra
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i.e., if the measure µ is induced by the transition Π and the initial distribution µ4.
Given an invariant measure µ, a measurable subset A0 ⊂ J is invariant if
µ({s ∈ A0 | Π(s) ∈ P (A0)}) = 1,
i.e., if µ-almost everywhere a state in A0 will be transformed into A0 by Π
5. A
measure µ is ergodic if µ(A0) ∈ {0, 1} for any invariant set A06. We shall refer to
(J,Π, µ) as an ergodic Markov equilibrium of G.
Let S = Y × Z, with Y and Z being Borel spaces. Given µ ∈ P (S), let suppµ
denote the support of µ. Denote by PF (Y × Z) the set of probability measures
µ ∈ P (Y × Z) such that to each µ there exists a map hµ : Y → Z such that if
s ∈ suppµ there exists a y ∈ Y such that s = (y, hµ(y)) µ-a.e., i.e., µ(Gr(hµ)) = 1
where Grhµ = {(y, hµ(y)) ∈ Y × Z | y ∈ Y } is the graph of hµ.
A Markov equilibrium (J,Π) is spotless if Π(s) ∈ PF (Y × Z) for all s ∈ J , i.e.,
if for any state the transition map has a one-to-one correspondence between the
exogenous and endogenous variables. A Markov equilibrium (J,Π) is conditionally
spotless if, for all s ∈ J , there is some M ⊂ PF (S) ∩G(s) and α ∈ P (M) such that
Π(s) =
∫
M
ν dα(ν).
How do these definitions relate to our model?
Definition 4 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium of E is a consistent S-valued state
process s = (st) with the property that, for all i, the strategy (θi, xi) is optimal given
s.
This is the standard competitive equilibrium concept. It is encompassed into
our framework as follows.
Definition 5 (Equilibrium transition) An equilibrium transition of E is a pair
(J,Π), where J ⊂ S is measurable and Π: J → P (J) is a transition map with the
properties:
1. for any y¯ ∈ Y , there is a point [y¯, (θ−, θ, x, q, w)] ∈ J , and
2. each time-homogeneous Markov J-valued process (st) with transition Π is an
equilibrium process.
The first condition states that any starting parameter y ∈ Y is admissible. The
second condition, that each state process generated by the transition map is an
equilibrium, i.e., consistent and individually optimal.
4If we consider the map µ 7→ KΠ[µ] =
∫
Π(s,A) dµ(s) from P (J) into itself, then an invariant
measure is a fixed point of this map.
5Note that {s ∈ A0 | Π(s) ∈ P (A0)} = Π−1(P (A0)) ∩A0.
6The set of ergodic measures is the set of extreme points of the set of invariant measures. Thus,
if Π is continuous by the Krein-Milman there exists ergodic measures. However, this is in general
too strong a requirement since Π is “endogenous”.
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3.3 The Results
Firstly, we state the result that there exists an open set of endowments which has
no competitive equilibrium without intermediation costs. The second result, is that
there exists stationary equilibrium processes, moreover these can be ergodic, while
this may involve “sun-spots”, see the discussion in [23]. And thirdly we state results
concerning conditions on the economy under which the volume of the equilibrium
portfolios increases without boundary when the intermediation costs go to zero.
Proposition 4 There exists an economy E = (e,D, 0) such that there exists no
equilibrium. There exists an economy E = (e,D, 0) and an open neighbourhood Ω′
of e such that any economy E ′ = (e′, D, 0), e′ ∈ Ω does not have an equilibrium.
Proof:
Example 11 in section 3.6 shows the first statement.
It is easy to see that perturbating the endowments in this example preserves the
non-existence of an equilibrium, and hence the second statement is proved.

A finite horizon example is given in [51].
Proposition 5 Any economy E = (e,D, c) has a spotless equilibrium transition with
intermediation costs c > 0.
Proof: The proof is in section 3.5. 
Let us add some comments on this result. First of all, it is remarkable that a
stationary equilibrium exists with heterogeneous agents. However, as pointed out in
[23] the solution is to expand the state space, and include the asset portfolio from
the previous period in the state space, while imposing consistency requirements in
the construction of an equilibrium. Why should we care about the existence of a
stationary equilibrium? One important argument is the coordination of expectations
among agents. To quote [32]
“an equilibrium which does not display minimal regularity through time
- maybe stationarity - is unlikely to generate the coordination between
agents that it assumes.”.
A stronger result would be to show the existence of an ergodic equilibrium. An
advantage compared to “just” a THME is that, in the latter, you can have several
invariant sets and thus there exist more simple equilibrium transitions - vaguely one
can say that every measurable subset of states in an ergodic equilibrium is essential.
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If you take a measurable subset of positive measure then any equilibrium process
has a positive probability of occurring in this subset.
The stationarity and the use of a dynamic system is essential in the interpretation
of our results on volatility, while not the technical arguments.
Proposition 6 Assume that (e,D, 0) does not have an equilibrium and that cn → 0,
for every K ≥ 0 there exists an integer n0 ≥ 0 such that for every n ≥ n0, there
exists an equilibrium of (e,D, cn), with θn being the portfolio process, such that
‖θn‖∞ ≥ K.
Proof: The proof is in section 3.5. 
Let us try to explain the intuition behind our result: Assume that without inter-
mediation costs there exists no equilibrium. This non-existence must arise due to a
lack of boundary on the security trades, since all other variables are bounded. In-
troducing intermediation costs implies that financing such portfolios with increased
volume must imply that at least agent has no lower bound on the consumption of
the perishable good, and she can increase her utility by not using such a portfolio.
Thus, there exists an equilibrium with intermediation costs. Considering then an
economy with no intermediation costs and with no equilibrium, and a sequence of
equilibria with intermediation costs, such that the costs go to zero, then the volume
of security trades must go to infinity, eventually.
Corollary 1 There exists an open set Ω′ ⊂ Ω and a dividend D, such that any
(e,D, c) ∈ Ω′ × {D} × {0} if cn → 0 and (xn, θn, qn) ∈ E(e, cn) for every n, then
there exists an integer N such that ‖θn‖∞ ≥ K for every n ≥ N .
To conclude, we have showed that without changing the fluctuations of the fun-
damentals in the economy, the volume of asset trade can increase infinitely when
the intermediation costs goes to zero. Moreover, for a given asset structure the
probability of having an economy with this property is strictly positive.
Another result is stated as follows:
Corollary 2 Let e ∈ Ω be such that E(e, 0) = ∅, then for every K ≥ 0 there exists
an open neighbourhood U of e such that if e′ ∈ U , cn → 0 and (xn, θn, qn) ∈ E(e′, cn)
for every n, then there exists an integer N such that ‖θn‖∞ ≥ K for every n ≥ N .
The point is that using proposition 6, we get boundless asset trade when the pure
equilibrium does not exist, while economies close to this economy also have equilibria
that are close to the equilibria of this economy, but then going arbitrarily close to
this economy, a zero sequence of costs implies asset trades without boundary. This
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last result obviously extends the scope of our result, since even asset structures with
linear dependence on prices have open sets with arbitrarily boundless asset trade.
Our results so far have shown that a sufficient condition for a boundless increase
in the volume of trade in securities is that the pure economy does not have an
equilibrium. However, this condition is not necessary as shown in section 3.4.
3.4 Income streams
Let us reformulate the model in income streams instead of portfolios and the asset
market is characterized by a map from prices into the collection of subsets of income
streams. Thus asset prices and dividends are “build” into the concept of feasible in-
come streams. This concept should help us explain the non-existence of equilibrium
processes.
It is easy to see that the model is equivalently formulated using either of the
two: For any D : Rn → Rm define 〈D〉 = {Dθ | θ ∈ Rn} to be the range of D. It is
then easy to see that for any two economies E = (e,D, 0) and E ′ = (e,D′, 0), with
〈D〉 = 〈D′〉, then (x, θ, q) is an equilibrium of E if and only if it is an equilibrium
of E ′. Denote by (ri) the corresponding income transfer processes. By the result
of [43] if D = D0 is a constant, i.e., we consider purely nominal assets, then there
always exists an equilibrium price q0 ∈ Q, see e.g. [7]. Assume moreover that7
rit ∈ ri〈D0〉 for some i and t, i.e., that at least one trade in all of the states is carried
through8. Next, consider a continuous map D : Q→ RY such that 〈D(q0)〉 = 〈D0〉,
such that if D is homogenous of degree one, then, generically, the set of equilibria
is finite and locally unique. We claim that we can choose a path γ : [0, 1]→ D such
that γ(0) = D(q0) = D0 and γ(1) = D1, such that 〈γ(t)〉 = 〈D0〉 for every t < 1
and rankD1 < rankD0
9. Then for any sequence of economies En = (e, γ(tn), 0),
tn =
1
1−n−1 all has p0 as equilibrium pricevector. This is because what matters for
7Where riA is the relative interior of a set A ⊂ Rn, i.e., the interior relative to the smallest
affin space containing A.
8This condition resembles the condition of [7] which states that the matrix D·10 (f(p, ω0)) has
full rank, which basically states that consumers disagree on the residual states over the number of
assets.
9To see this, let A : Rn → Rm be a linear map of full rank. Consider then the linear map
Bt : Rn → Rm given by Aei = Btei for i < n and Bten = (1 − t)Aen. Then rankBt = rankA for
every t 6= 1 and rankB1 = rankA − 1. Alternatively, let Bei = Aei for i < n and Ben = Aen−1
and consider the map Ct : Rn → Rm with Ctei = Aei for i < n and Cten = (tB + (1− t)A)en. We
note that regardless of the choice of Ct above, detCt = (1 − t) detA (since detB = 0 and in the
last case detCt = tdetB + (1− t) detA) such that since detA 6= 0, detCt 6= 0 if and only if t 6= 1.
Let r ∈ 〈A〉, r = Aθ θ = (θiei) ∈ Rn, then r = Btθ¯ with θ¯ = (θ−n, (1 − t)−1θn). Also, r = Ctθ¯
with θ¯ = (θ−n, θn − t(θn − θn−1)). This implies that 〈A〉 = 〈Bt〉 = 〈Ct〉 for every t 6= 1.
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each consumer is the income stream, and not the particular portfolio necessary to
achieve the income stream. Assume then that q0 is not a no-trade equilibrium, then
we claim that any sequence of asset trades (θn) associated with the equilibrium q0
of the sequence of economies (En) must satisfy that lim ‖θn‖ = ∞. Assume not,
then letting θ¯ be a limit point we must have by the continuity of the dual map
(A, x) 7→ Ax on the Banach space of linear maps that r = lim γ(tn)θn = D1θ¯.
However, since r is an interior point of 〈D0〉 = 〈γ(t)〉, t < 1 we cannot have that
r ∈ 〈D1〉.
However, more is true. Assume that the economy is regular such that in a
small neighbourhood of e there exists a continuous function q(e) of equilibrium
prices. Consider then for any e′ close enough to e the path γ˜ such that γ˜(s) =
D(q(se+ (1− s)e′)) and paste the paths γ and γ˜. This implies that there exists an
open set of economies parameterized by the endowments such that asset trades are
above some given threshold M <∞. This indeed implies that high volumes of asset
trades is not a negligible phenomenon.
We claim that var(θni ) → ∞, generically. If this were not true, then we should
have that var( 1
E θni
θni ) → 0. However, this would imply that the income stream is
constant across states, which is not true in general.
To illustrate our point(s), consider the following example:
Example 7 Let
Dt =
 1 0 01 1 1
t t 1

be the asset structure for any t ∈ [0, 1). Then for any income stream v = (v1, v2, v3)
the corresponding portfolio is given by
θt =
 v1−v1 + v2−v31−t
v3−tv2
1−t
 .
But then limt→1 ‖θt‖ =∞ whenever v2 6= v3.
In the example we obtain that var(θt3) =
1
(1−t)2 var(v3− tv2), such that if var(v3−
v2) 6= 0 then we have that limt→1 var(θt3) = ∞. Note also that the “normalized”
variance is
var(θt3)
E(θt3)
= 1
1−t
var(v3−tv2)
E(v3−tv2) , and thus that it is not just due to the increased
level of trade but also in order to obtain a better risk dispersion. Actually, we have
var(θt) =
 var θt1var θt2
var θt3
 =
 var v1var v1 + 1(1−t)2 var(v2 − v3)− 11−t cov(v1, v2 − v3)
1
1−t var(v3 − tv2)
 ,
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where cov(s, t) = E[(s − E s)(t − E t)] is the covariance wrt the random variables
s, t. Again, whenever var(v2 − v3) = var(v2 − v3) 6= 0 it holds that limt→1 var(θt2) =
limt→1 var(θt3) =∞.
3.5 Existence of equilibrium transitions
In this section we show the proof of proposition 5 and 6. For that purpose we
define a (not necessarily non-empty-valued) correspondence which is going to be
our equilibrium correspondence or expectations correspondence:
Definition 6 Given a state s0 = [y0, (θ
−
0 , θ0, x0, q0, w0)] ∈ S, denote by g(s0) ⊂
P (S) the set of measures µ ∈ P (S) such that
1. supp(µ) = Gr(hs0) for some function hs0 : Y → Z
2. the marginal of µ on Y (resp. Θ−) is µY = pi(y0) (resp. µΘ− = δθ0)
10
3. for all i, (x0i, x1i, θi0) solves
maxui(x0i) + β E[ui(x1i)]
subject to
q0 · θi0 + xi0 = D(y0, q0)θ−i0 + ei(y0)− c(θi0) + wi0
q1 · θi1 + xi1 = D(y1, q1)θi0 + ei(y1)− c(θi1) + wi1
for any random variable s1 = [y1, (θ
−
1 , θ1, x1, q1, w1)] with distribution µ
4. x1 ≥ x almost surely.
Remark:
Note that there is no measurebility problem in the definition of g condition 3
since, by condition 1, the support of µ is finitely valued and hence the maximization
problem is a finite dimensional Euclidean space. This implies given µ ∈ g(s0) then
for every random variable s1 with distribution µ there exists multipliers λi(s1) ≥ 0,
elements of R#Y for every consumer i, such that (xi0, xi1, θi0) solves
maxu(x0) + β
∑
y
µ(y, hs0(y))u(x1(y, hs0(y))) + λi0(s1)k0(s0) + λi1(s1)
Tk1(s0, s1)
and k1(s0, s1) ∈ R#Y . The functions k0, k1 being the budget constraints of condition
3.
10We denote by δx the Dirac-measure with unit-mass on x.
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Since c is a convex function the set of subgradients ∂c(x) is non-empty11 (see
[54]) and thus according to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem [54, p. 281, Theorem 28.3] we
must have that
u′(x0) + λ0 = 0 (3.3)
βµ(y)u′(x1(y)) + λ
y
1 = 0 (3.4)
λ0(q0 + κ(θ0)) +
∑
y
λy1D(y) = 0 (3.5)
where κ(θ0) ∈ ∂c(θ0) being the necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus, we could
substitute the condition 3 of definition 6 with equations (3.3)-(3.5).
End of remark
Remark:
Second, note the following: if g 6= ∅ and J is an invariant set, then we obtain a
map H : J × Y → Z given by
H(s0, y) = H((y0, [θ
−
0 , θ0, x0, q0, w0]), y) = hs0(y) ∈ Z
such that a realised equilibrium path (st) must satisfy that st+1 = (yt+1, H(st, yt+1))
and hence zt+1 = H(zt, yt+1).
End of remark
Denote by η(T ) the set of T -horizon equilibria states, i.e., the set of T -horizon
processes (st)
T
t=1 that are optimal to each consumer using the utility index U
T
i .
The following lemmas show how to construct an ergodic equilibrium: The first
establish a lower bound on the consumption compatible with any finite equilibrium.
Lemma 7 There exists x¯ ∈ Rn++, such that for all T and (st)Tt=1 ∈ η(T ), then for
all i and t, xit ≥ x¯i almost surely.
Proof:
Follows immediately from the fact that the endowment is always feasible, and
the property from equation (3.1) with r0 = maxy
∑
i ei(y) > 0 and x¯i = xi(r0) > 0.

Next, we show that any equilibrium price sequence must be uniformly bounded.
Lemma 8 There exists q¯ ∈ Rk+, such that, for any finite T , if (st)Tt=1 ∈ η(T ), then
for all t we have |qt| ≤ q¯ almost surely.
11x? ∈ Rn is a subgradient of c at x0 if c(x0)− c(x) ≥ x? · (x0−x) for every x ∈ Rn, and ∂c(x) is
called the subdifferential of c at x. When c is differentiable the subgradients are unique and equals
it’s gradient
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Proof:
Let (θit, xit)t be a strategy in equilibrium of consumer i. Consider the following
modification of the strategy: In the current period t, replace the final portfolio θit
with (1 − )θit, spending additional qt · θit on consumption. In any period τ > t,
replace (θiτ , xiτ ) with (1 − )(θiτ , xiτ + 1−ei). This strategy is still feasible, since
both the intertemporal budget constraints, the intermediation costs are convex, and
the transversality condition are satisfied.
This modification of the strategy leads to a loss of expected utility in future
periods that is bounded, and this bound can be made uniform, such that it does
not depend on the horizon T , and it goes to zero when → 0. Moreover, the loss is
independent of asset prices.
Assume next that (qt) is unbounded. Note, that for every t there exists some i
such that qt · θit > 0. Then, consider this consumer and using the above described
strategy, since qt →∞, this increment can be taken to be bounded away from zero
even though → 0. But the loss goes to zero, and hence the strategy could not be
optimal in the first place. Thus, (qt) must be bounded.

We note that this boundary on securities prices is also valid even when c = 0.
We next show that the portfolios of any finite horizon equilibria are uniformly
bounded:
Lemma 9 There exists θ¯ ∈ Rk+, such that, for any finite T , if (st)Tt=1 ∈ η(T ), then
for all t we have |θit| ≤ θ¯ almost surely, for every i.
Proof:
Assume that for every θ¯ there exists T0 and (st)
T0
t=0 ∈ η(T0) such that ‖θit‖ > θ¯
for some t. Thus, there exists a sequence (Tn)n∈N, (tn)n∈N and (snt ) ∈ η(Tn) such
that limn→∞ ‖θnitn‖ = ∞ for some i. Since
∑
iw
n
itn − c(θnitn) = 0 this must imply
that there exists j such that limnw
n
jtn = ∞. Note that we can assume that it is
the same j since the number of consumers is finite. Consider then the alternative
strategy (x˜njt, θ˜
n
jt) with θ˜
n
jt = (1 − ε)θnj,t for every t 6= tn then the consumption x˜jtn
must satisfy that
x˜njtn − xnjtn = εqntn · θnjtn − D(ytn , qntn) · θni,tn−1 − c(θ˜njtn) + c(θnjtn)
≥ ε(qntn · θnjtn −D(ytn , qntn) · θni,tn−1 + c(θnjtn))
and since limn q
n
tn · θnjtn − D(ytn , qntn) + c(θnjtn) = ∞ because (xnit) is bounded and
limnw
n
jtn =∞ we must have that limn x˜njtn−xnjtn =∞. Further, let x˜nj,t = (1−ε)xnj,t
for every t 6= tn which is feasible. This must imply that taking ε > 0 sufficiently
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small there exists some n0 such that (θ˜
n0
jtn0
, x˜n0jtn0 ) is a better feasible trading plan
than (θn0jtn0 , x
n0
jtn0
) which is a contradiction.

Lemma 9 also induces a boundary w¯ ∈ R+ such that any equilibrium process
must have that wt ≤ w¯ for every t.
We next show that any partial sequence of a finite equilibrium is also a equilib-
rium in the corresponding partial economy.
Lemma 10 For any T ≥ 2, if (st)Tt=1 ∈ η(T ), then (st)Tt=2 ∈ η(T − 1).
Proof:
This follows from the Bellman’s principle of optimality and, in particular, from
the separability of the utility.

For any T , let
ST = {s ∈ S | ∃(st)Tt=1 ∈ η(T ) : s1 = s = [y, (ξ, θ, x, q, w)]},
i.e., the set of initial states in some T -horizon equilibrium. We next show that for
every finite horizon, this set projected onto Y is the entire space:
Lemma 11 For all finite T and all y0 ∈ Y , there exists [y0, (ξ, θ, x, q, w)] ∈ ST
Proof:
This follows from [45] and the extension to multiple periods in appendix A.

In particular, this implies that ST 6= ∅ for every T .
Define next the compact subset K of S by
K ≡ {[y, (θ−, θ, x, q, w)] ∈ S | x ≥ x ∧ |q| ≤ q¯ ∧ |θ| ≤ θ ∧ w ≤ w¯},
where x ∈ Rn++ is given by equation (3.1), q¯ ∈ Rk++ is obtained from lemma 8 and
θ ∈ Rk++ (and w¯ ∈ R++) is obtained from lemma 9.
We define a sequence (C0T )T∈N0 as follows: let C00 = K and for every T ≥ 1 let
C0,T = {s ∈ K | ∃ν ∈ g(s) : ν?(C0,T−1) = 1},
i.e., the set of states of equilibrium such that the inner measure12 of C0,T−1 is 1. The
reason why we use the inner measure, instead of the measure itself, is that we do
12Given a probability space (Ω,M, ν) the inner measure ν? of ν is given by ν?(A) =
supB∈M,B⊂A ν(B) for every subset A ⊂ Ω.
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not know the measurability property of C0,T−1. Moreover, we consider the double
sequence (Ci,j)i,j∈N0 for i, j ≥ 1 given by
Ci,j = {s ∈ C0,j | ∃s′ ∈ Ci−1,j+1, ν ∈ G(s′) : s ∈ supp ν, ν?(C0j) = 1}.
Thus, Cij contains the states that would occur in period i of an “(i+ j + 1)-period
equilibrium” in K running from period 0 to period i + j. We next show that ST
is contained in every C0,T , and hence according to lemma 11, C0T 6= ∅ for every
T ∈ N0:
Lemma 12 For every T we have ST ⊂ C0,T .
Proof:
The proof is by induction on T . When T = 1 then C0,T−1 = C00 = K and thus
C0,1 = {s ∈ K | ∃ν ∈ g(s) : ν?(K) = 1}
Obviously, if (st) ∈ S1 then s1 = s ∈ K. But then consider the measure ν = δs1
and since δs1 ∈ g(s) and δs1(K) = 1, since s1 ∈ K we are done. Next, assume that
ST−1 ⊂ C0,T−1, we must then show that this implies that ST ⊂ C0,T . Thus, consider
some element s ∈ ST , then there exists (st) such that (st) ∈ η(T + 1) and s1 = s,
but then by lemma 11 we have that (st) ∈ η(T ), such that s1 ∈ ST−1 and thus
s1 ∈ C0,T−1, by the induction hypothesis. But then δs1(C0,T−1) = 1.

We now apply the following result:
Theorem 8 ([23], Theorem 1.2) Suppose that g is a correspondence with closed
graph such that C0,j 6= ∅ for every j = 0, 1, . . . . If there exists i0 such that Ci0,j0 has
compact closure for some j0 then
⋂
j∈N0 clCi0,j is a self-justified set.
Thus, since closedness is preserved under arbitrary intersections, the self-justified
set is a closed subset of a compact set, and hence compact.
In particular, lemma 12 implies that C0,T 6= ∅ for every T . Now, it is easy to see
that g has closed graph, and thus by lemma 12 and theorem 8, we obtain a compact
self-justified set.
The next proposition is also from [23]:
Proposition 9 ([23], Proposition 1.3) Let Y be a finite set, and for s ∈ S let
g˜(s) = {ν ∈ g(s) | ν ∈ PF (Y × Z)} = g(s) ∩ PF (Y × Z),
with g(s) ⊂ P (S) being an expectations correspondence. Then
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1. g˜ is an expectations correspondence.
2. If g˜ has a compact self-justified set J , then g˜ has a spotless THME, and there
is an ergodic Markov equilibrium for the correspondence gˆ : J → P (J) := s 7→
gˆ(s) = cl conv g˜(s).
3. If g is convex-valued, then an ergodic Markov equilibrium for gˆ is a condition-
ally spotless ergodic Markov equilibrium for g.
Denote next gˆ : S → P (S) by gˆ(s) = cl conv g(s). Using proposition 9 we obtain
a spotless THME for g and there is an ergodic Markov equilibrium for gˆ. Denote
this ergodic equilibrium (J,Π, µ), where Π: J → P (J) is the equilibrium transition
map, J is the compact self-justified and invariant set, and µ is an invariant measure
on J .
Proposition 10 Given a state process (st)
∞
t=1 = ([yt, (θ
−
t , θt, xt, qt)])
∞
t=1 with transi-
tion function Π, for any agent i, the corresponding strategy (θit, xit)
∞
t=1 is optimal.
Proof:
The proof follows closely [23, pp. 768, Proposition 3.2] and we shall not replicate
the proof here. We only note that according to the equations 3.3-3.5 we obtain a
sequence of subgradients η(θ) ∈ ∂c(θ) however according to [54, Theorem 24.4] this
sequence converges to a subgradient of the limit portfolio. Using this subgradient
instead of the gradient in [23] the proof goes through.

This ends the proof of proposition 5. We next turn to the proof of proposition
6.
Proof: [Proof of Proposition 6]
First we note that continuity of the budget correspondence in the transaction
costs is showed as in [45] when we endow the space of cost functions with the
compact-open topology.
The non-existence of an equilibrium without any transaction costs, i.e., c = 0,
implies the following: Let (st) be a sequence which is S-valued, then there exists
some i, a strategy (x′it, θ
′
it) and τ such that (x
′
iτ , θ
′
iτ ) 6= (xiτ , θiτ ) which is feasible
and Ui(x
′
i) > Ui(xi).
Assume that the sequence of equilibrium process ((snt )t∈N0)n∈N0 is bounded and
let (snt )t∈N0 be a limit point. Using the continuity of Ui there exists an open neigh-
bourhood U of (x′it, θ
′
it) such that every strategy in U is strictly preferred to (xit, θit).
Using the continuity of the budget there exists some N large enough such that
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(x′it, θ
′
it) is feasible with transaction costs cn, n ≥ N . Again, using the continuity of
the utility there exists N ′ such that Ui(x′i) > Ui(x
n
i ) for every n ≥ N ′.

3.6 Examples
Consider the following example showing that there exists an economy in which there
exists no equilibrium when the intermediation cost is zero:
Example 11 Let H = {A,B}, a single perishable commodity, Y = {1, 2} and
pi(1) = pi(2) = 1
2
. The endowments
eA0 = e
B
0 = (e0(1), e0(2)) = (1, 1)
(eAt , e
B
t ) = ((e
A
t (1), e
A
t (2)), (e
B
t (1), e
B
t (2)))) = ((
4
3
,
2
3
), (
2
3
,
4
3
)),
and the von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions
uh(x) =
x1−γh
1− γh .
with subjective discount factor βh. Let
Dt =
(
v1 v1
0 v2
)
be the asset structure. Assuming that βA = βB the allocation
(xAt , x
B
t ) = ((1, 1), (1, 1))
will be an equilibrium. The prices on the Arrow-securities will then be(
q1
q2
)
=
(
βu′(1)v1
pi2βu
′(1)v2
)
Assume on the other hand that Dt = (1, 1). Then x
h
t = e
h
t , h = A,B will be the
equilibrium allocation with asset price
q = β
1
2
(u′(e1) + u′(e2)).
Assume next that v2 = max{k − q1, 0} and v1 = 1 (denote V˜ this asset structure)
which implies that (
q1
q2
)
=
(
βu′(1)
1
2
βu′(1) max{k − βu′(1), 0}
)
.
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Asset 2 is then an (call) option on asset 1. Then when k > βu′(1) there exists no
equilibrium: Assume that (xAt , x
B
t ) = ((1, 1), (1, 1)) is an equilibrium allocation of V˜ ,
but then q2 = v2 = 0 and q1 = βu
′(1). Hence, if
1
2
β(u′(e1) + u′(e2)) > k > βu′(1)
we have a contradiction. However, this is possible when 1
2
u′(e1) + 12u
′(e2) > u′(1)
but this holds when
u′(pi1e1 + pi2e2) < pi1u′(e1) + pi2u′(e2)
which is the case here. But u′′′(x) = γ(γ + 1)x−γ−2 > 0 and thus u′ is convex the
inequality holds.
This is also the case when v(x) = − 1
a
e−ax.
The point of this example is that, if we consider a sequence of equilibria with
decreasing intermediation costs and this sequence converges to this equilibrium,
then the volume of asset trades will go to infinity.
Example 12 Consider the following economy: Y = {1}, L = 2 with
e0 =
(
eA0
eB0
)
=
(
(4
3
, 1)
(4
3
, 2
3
)
)
et =
(
eAt
eBt
)
=
(
(2
3
, 4
3
)
(4
3
, 2
3
)
)
uh(x1, x2) =
∑
l
ηhl
x1−γl
1− γ
and the discounting βA = βB =
99
100
. Let γ = 2 and
η =
(
ηA
ηB
)
=
(
(2, 1)
(1, 1)
)
We consider different asset structures: one with complete and several with different
degrees of incomplete markets. These gives us relative prices (i.e. rt ≡ p1tp2t ):
(r0, rt) = (0.545, 1.394)
(r0, rt) = (0.574, 1.382),
(r0, r1, rt) = (0.555, 1.422, 1.382),
(r0, r1, r2, rt) = (0.55, 1.408, 1.408, 1.382).
The first are relative prices when income transfers are perfectly tradeable; the second
where income transfers are not tradeable at all; the third where trade is possible
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between the first and second period but not in the succeeding periods, etc. We see
a pattern here: if T ≥ 1 markets are open initially and t > T is closed, then we
obtain relative prices rT0 ∈ [0.574, 0.545], rTt ∈ [1.395, 1.422] for every t < T , and
rTt = 1.382 for every t > T .
Whence introducing the following option
Dt(p) = max
{
k − p1t
p2t
, 0
}
(3.6)
there exists no equilibrium with k ∈ (1.382, 1.394).
Alternatively, let the endowments be
e0 =
(
eA0
eB0
)
=
( (
4
3
, 4
3
)(
2
3
, 2
3
) )
Again, we consider two different asset structures: one with complete and one with
incomplete markets. Similarly, relative prices (i.e. rt ≡ p1tp2t ) are then
(r0, rt) = (1.445, 0.361)
(r0, rt) = (1.579, 0.355)
(r0, r1, rt) = (1.496, 0.374, 0.355)
(r0, r1, r2, rt) = (1.47, 0.367, 0.367, 0.355).
Again, introducing the option in equation 3.6 there exists no equilibrium with
k ∈ (0.355, 0.361). We note that as a function of the number of open markets, the
relative price of period 1 jumps up going from autarky to trade between period 0
and 1. Henceforth, the relative price decreases monotonically towards the complete
market relative price, while still being above the autarky relative price.
Here, since there exists no equilibrium without intermediation cost, and any equi-
librium sequence with decreasing intermediation costs must have a boundless volume
of asset trades.
3.7 Conclusion and comments
Empirical observations indicate that the number and volume of trades of stocks
have increased during the period 1990-2000, and that is has, by far, exceeded the
increase in income (GDP). Thus, it is difficult to believe that the increased income
can account for this remarkable increment. This paper suggests that the increased
volume of trade can be explained by a decrease in the intermediation or transaction
cost of trading on the financial markets. While this might not seem too surprising,
we claim that the observed increase in volume of trade is not only the direct effect
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of a decrease in the trading costs. We suggest an additional contributing element:
the indirect effect of the reduction in the intermediation costs. We show that when
intermediation costs decrease this has an effect on asset and commodity prices,
now as well as in the future. This change in prices results in changes in the price-
dependent securities’ dividends, such as options, stocks, etc. Now, if these induced
changes in the dividend reduce the risk dispersion of a current portfolio, the traders
need to trade more intensively in order to obtain the same risk profile. In this paper
we show that this effect can be very large and, in extreme cases, without boundary.
Let us again try to justify the introduction of intermediation costs: we argue
that even in the case of fixed fee there is an increasing intermediation/transaction
cost in the amount of securities that you have to trade. However, we admit that
the story does not fit very well with the competitive framework that we consider
in this paper. The justification is based upon market microstructure theory and/or
search models. They both take their starting point in the actual situation in which
a trader finds him self: the actual trading process. But as long as the competitive
framework is considered as an approximation to reality, we believe that the story is
not that far from reality. Assume that given an initial portfolio and some expected
average asset price, you wish to change your portfolio. Now, this desired change
must be carried about using some form of trading strategy using a trading place,
like a stock exchange. Now, all significant changes in portfolios in a market affect
the trading price that you obtain: if you sell in a thin market you will end up with
a low price, while buying in a thin market increases you buying price. Thus, you
will have to choose some appropriate strategy to obtain the most profitable trading
prices. The market game is then given by a strategy, specifying when to announce
your buying and selling orders and how large volumes each buying/selling order
should amount to. The payoff is the expected revenue from the trades carried out
given the strategies of every trader. The point is that the larger the volume of trade
a trader wants to carry through is to his disadvantages, and thus that the marginal
cost increases as the volume of the desired portfolio change increases, and that in
the limit this cost is infinity. The search theory would take the starting point that
in order to make a trade the buyer and the seller literally have to find each other.
However, we shall not pursue this any further.
As can be easily realized our result does not depend on the fact that we consider
intermediation costs instead of transaction costs. Also, adding more spot commodi-
ties does not alter our results. It also seems robust to the assumption of stationarity.
A more severe problem is that we take the security structure and intermediation cost
function as exogenous. Ideally, these variables should be endogenous in a genuine
general equilibrium model.
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The Existence of a Free Lunch,
Equilibrium in Income Streams,
and Transaction Costs
Tobias Markeprand
Abstract. We show that in the presence of strictly convex transaction costs, an
arbitrage opportunity is consistent with equilibrium with rational agents. We show
that there exist equilibria where arbitrage opportunities exist but are not exploited.
Further, we show that equilibria exist where arbitrage opportunities exist and are
exploited. This may undermine the importance of arbitrage in the theory of financial
pricing based solely on the no arbitrage principle.
JEL classification:. D11, D51, G12, G14.
Keywords:. Incomplete Markets, General Equilibrium, Transaction Costs, Free
Lunches.
45
Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
As [58] argues, the concept of no-arbitrage, which includes the law of one price or
the absence of a free lunch, in its most general interpretation is fundamental in
the concept of competitive equilibrium and in the way economists think. The basic
content of the no-arbitrage principle is that you cannot gain something for free -
there is no free lunch. And as [41] writes
“In any economic equilibrium, it should not be possible to purchase
at zero cost a bundle of goods that will strictly increase some agent’s
utility.”
Also, this principle is the foundation upon which almost all of finance theory, empiri-
cally and theoretically, is based. We show that in the case that intermediation costs,
or transactions costs, are present the no-arbitrage principle does not necessarily hold
within the framework of a general equilibrium model with perfect competition and
symmetric information. We show that agents with small demand for risk disper-
sion can benefit from small marginal intermediation costs and exploit the constant
marginal asset prices, to exploit an arbitrage opportunity and obtain a positive
income stream in each state, the current as well as the future states. We show
that there exist equilibria where arbitrage opportunities are exploited and equilibria
where they are not exploited. The key point when preferences are strictly monotone,
is that the costless gains are bounded, as in [14]1 where it is called Limited arbitrage.
Often the argument for no-arbitrage goes as follows: Consider the price of gold,
then the absence of arbitrage possibilities implies that the price must be the same
in New York and in Paris; if not, e.g., if the price is 1 in New York and 0.9 in
Paris, then one could buy an ounce of gold in Paris and sell it in New York gaining
a profit of 0.1. A modification of this is that the prices can differ by the costs
of transportation. However, this is not a violation of the no free lunch principle,
since the price difference cannot be exploited to gain a riskless positive profit. The
approach adopted in this paper assumes that the marginal transportation cost is
not linear and increases when the quantity of gold is large enough; Hence only small
quantities of gold can exploit the arbitrage opportunity, and explains why not all of
the gold in Paris is shipped to New York.
Yet another illustration of the no-arbitrage argument, is the joke of a professor
of economics who refuse the existence of a $ 100 bill lying on the ground, due to the
fact that then someone would have picked it up! The examples in this paper show
that this is in general false. The lesson learned from this paper is that you cannot
1We stress that the results of [14] and [15] are based upon a false prove, see the discussion [48]
and [49].
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conclude that there is not any certain gain to obtain - just because nobody else has
earned it!
The existence of arbitrage opportunities in equilibrium has been showed before.
However, this has been in the framework of market games, i.e., with imperfect
competition, see e.g. [40]. The main argument is that arbitrage opportunities may
exist, since if any agent attempts to exploit this opportunity, he/she will change the
resulting prices and taking this into account it may be disadvantageous. However,
while they may exist in equilibrium they cannot be exploited, and it is thus not a
genuine arbitrage opportunity. Moreover, [29] shows that a necessary condition for
this result is the presence of wash-sales, i.e., the simultaneous buying and selling in
the same market by a single trader. However, such a trading strategy is eliminated
by utility maximizing when (arbitrary small, linear) transaction costs are introduced,
see [10]. [10] then proceeds to conclude that the results by [40] are not robust to
the introduction of arbitrarily small transaction costs. Our result shows that this
relies on the introduction of linear transaction costs, while the introduction of non-
linear transaction costs not only reestablish, but strengthen the result. [42] argues,
like us, that mispricing might persist due to costs of trading, but they assume
the existence of noise, and hence irrational, traders. In their model the irrationality
creates uncertainty, which again creates costs of trading to risk averse traders, which
then eliminates the rational traders from exploiting the arbitrage opportunity. This
is in contrast to our model were all traders are rational! Furthermore, they cannot
explain persistent deviation of prices from the fundamental value, whereas we can.
Thus, the explanations of existence of free lunches in equilibrium have been based
upon either imperfect competition or irrational behaviour. We show that neither of
these assumptions are necessary.
A framework close to ours is [38], which studies the asset pricing in a model with
frictions, and, like us, they obtain an opportunity set which is convex. They do,
however, not analyze the existence of free lunches, but extend the work of [34] and
[41]. They obtain asset prices where atleast one agent is satisfied with consuming her
endowment (of income), such a price system is referred to as viable and they show
that such prices are consistent with an equilibrium and equivalent with the absence
of asymptotic free lunches. Furthermore, they characterize the set of viable asset
price systems in terms of a linear asset price. They show that the linear functional
must lie below the convex pricing rule on the marketed set. While the concept of
viable prices in the framework of [34] is characterizing asset prices that can occur in
equilibrium, i.e., with no frictions in the markets, our results show that this is not
the case with convex transaction costs. Further, our results imply that the claim by
[38] that
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“...viability is the minimal requirement for a price system (M,pi) to
model an economic equilibrium...”
is false. Indeed, we find an economy and an equilibrium, where the viability condi-
tion is violated.
Finally, we relate our results to the economics of asymmetric information. The
main focal point of this literature is The Efficient Market Hypothesis (see e.g. [30]
or [25]), which, informally, states that in a competitive market where agents ahve
rational expectations, current prices reflect all information available in the econ-
omy on the future return of the security. This implies that security prices convey all
available information and no trader can gain by exploiting private information. How-
ever, as [31] shows when the acquisition of information is costly and traders choose
their information level, prices only convey the aggregate information partially, since
informed traders have to be compensated for their expenditure on information ac-
quisition. This can only be the case if private information has a value. In this sense,
information is a public good provided by informed traders through the price mecha-
nism. Thus, without taking into account the cost of information there is a free lunch
to be exploited by the uninformed traders. However, to exploit the free lunch the
trader needs to acquire information which more than offsets the gain. Thus, again
the free lunch is not genuine. They consider competitive, rational traders as we do,
but differ by informational asymmetries.
In section 4.2 we introduce the model and in section 4.3 give our main results,
examples illustrating our main result on the existence of arbitrage opportunities. In
section 4.4 we show how the model of section 4.2 can be obtained as the trading of
assets with intermediation or transaction costs, and thus relates our model with the
standard GEI model. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Arbitrage and Equilibrium
Let there be two dates and S <∞ future states, the present s = 0 and the future,
s = 1, . . . , S.
The basic concept of a finance economy is the set of income streams, M ⊂ RS+1,
i.e., the set of income streams the agents can trade among each other.
Definition 7 A set of income streams is a set M ⊂ RS+1++ such that
1. M is closed, convex and non-empty
2. if r ∈M and r′ ≤ r then r′ ∈M , and
3. 0 ∈M
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Denote by M the collection of income streams sets. Any element r = (rs)Ss=0 =
(r0, r1, r2, . . . , rS) ∈ M ∈ M is called an income stream and rs is the income
available in state s.
We say that an income stream r ∈ M ∩ RS+1+ is an arbitrage opportunity or a
free lunch if r 6= 0. M satisfies the no-arbitrage principle when there is no-arbitrage
opportunity, i.e., when M ∩RS+1+ = {0}. We say that M has limited free lunches if
there exists K > 0 such that M ∩ {r ≥ 0 | ‖r‖ > K} = ∅.
According to the separation theorem of convex sets, for every income stream set
M ∈ M the no-arbitrage principle is satisfied if there exists a vector λM ∈ RS+1
and a number βM ∈ R such that λM · r < βM < λM · p for every r ∈ M and
p ∈ {p ∈ RS+1+ |
∑
p = 1}.
When M is a cone we obtain the well-known characterization by state prices
Proposition 13 Assume that M is a convex cone, then M satisfies the no-arbitrage
principle if and only if there exist λ ∈ RS+1++ such that λ ·M ≤ 0.
Our concept of an economy basically lies close to [41], but we extend it with
some additional objects allowing us to include transaction costs.
Definition 8 A finance economy is a map M : X → M , where X a subset of a
vector space, an utility function ui representing the preferences on RS+1 for each
consumer i ∈ I, and a set Y ⊂ RI(S+1) referred to as the income production set.
Denote such an economy by E = (M, (ui)i∈I , Y ). Y is the set of aggregate
income streams which the economy can produce. The usual assumption is that
Y = {(ri) |
∑
ri = 0}, but other cases are also possible, and allow us to consider the
case of real transaction costs, i.e., where resources are required to exchange income.
We want to emphasis that introducing utility functions this way implies that
the income streams we consider are net income streams. However, in order to
avoid unnecessary repetation we just call an element r an income stream with the
understanding that it is actually a net income stream. Section 4.4 shows how we
can derive the utility functions from a more general model.
Definition 9 A financial equilibrium of E is then an asset price vector x? ∈ X and
income transfers (r?i )i∈I such that
• r?i maximizes ui on M(x?), and
• (r?i )i∈I ∈ Y .
In this paper, we assume that ui is a continuous, strictly monotone and quasi-
concave function for every agent i. Strict monotonicity implies that agents prefers
more income to less income, while quasi-concavity implies risk aversion. Two prop-
erties that seem very natural.
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4.3 The Results
What is then the relationship between no-arbitrage asset prices and an equilibrium
of a finance economy?
When M(x) is a convex, additive cone2 for all x, and strictly monotone pref-
erences3 then the no-arbitrage principle is a very natural property that an equilib-
rium asset price vector must satisfy: if r¯ ∈ M(x) is an arbitrage opportunity then
γr¯ ∈ M(x) is also an arbitrage principle for any γ ≥ 0. But then there exists no
maximizing consumption bundle: for any income stream r˜, since preferences are
strictly monotone ui(r˜ + γr¯) > ui(r˜) for any γ > 0, and r˜ cannot be an income
stream chosen in equilibrium since r˜ + γr¯ ∈M(x).
Thus, we arrive at the result not particularly original:
Lemma 13 Let M(x?) be an additive cone and (x?, (r?i )i∈I) is a financial equilib-
rium, then M(x?) ∩ RS+1+ = ∅.
However, when M(x) is not an additive cone, then the close relationship between
the no-arbitrage principle and equilibrium does no longer hold! And the fact that
βM = 0, as in Proposition 13, does not hold any longer. This can also be illustrated
with two questions:
• Can there exist equilibria where an arbitrage opportunity is available, but no
agent exploit this opportunity? The answer is yes!
• Can an equilibrium exist in which an arbitrage opportunity is exploited by
some agent(s)? The answer is, again, yes!
We argue by means of two examples, the first supports the first claim, while the
second supports our second claim.
We show that arbitrage opportunities and exploitations of arbitrage opportu-
nities can exist in a model of perfect competition and symmetric information, but
with intermediation costs. This also implies that there exists some consumer i with
λi · ri > 0, and the Proposition 13 does no longer hold.
More specifically, we show that
Proposition 14 When I ≥ 3, there exists economies E and a financial equilibrium
(x?, (r?i )i), such that M(x
?) ∩ RS+1+ 6= {0} and r?i > 0 for some i.
Proposition 15 There exists economies E, I ≥ 2 and a financial equilibrium (x?, (r?i )i),
such that M(x?) ∩ RS+1+ 6= {0}.
2A set M ⊂ Rn is an additive cone when x+ λy ∈M for every x, y ∈M and λ ≥ 1.
3f : Rn → R is strictly monotone if x > y then f(x) > f(y).
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The essential feature of this explanation of why arbitrage opportunities might
exists and be exploited in equilibrium is that intermediation costs are not (piecewise)
linear; this implies that, on the margin, small trades have low marginal intermedia-
tion costs, while large trades have high marginal intermediation costs. Thus, large
trades have no possibility of exploiting any arbitrage opportunity! Agents that do
not exploit the arbitrage opportunity does not have the incentive since the arbitrage
opportunity does not offer the same risk dispersion as the “normal” income streams.
When M(x) is not an additive cone, the no-arbitrage condition, i.e., that M(x)∩
RS+1+ = {0}, is not a necessary condition for a financial equilibrium to exist. In-
formally, if the gain in the arbitrage opportunity is sufficiently small, then a no-
arbitrage income stream might be preferred by a household: This is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. The point is that even when an arbitrage opportunity exist a maximal
income stream may exist!
-
6
M(x)
Figure 4.1: Income trade offs
An equilibrium in income streams relative to M(x) could look something like
Figure 4.2, where the income production set is of the form Y = {(ri) |
∑
i ri = 0}.
The most important thing is that the set M(x) does not recedes in the direcion
RS+1+ (see [54, pp. 61]), i.e., for any vector ξ ∈ RS+1+ , ξ 6= 0 we must have that
sup{γ | γξ ∈M(x)} <∞. If M(x) has a direction of infinity, then as the arguments
go above, the set of consumption bundles in the budget set is not compact, and thus
x cannot be an equilibrium asset price vector under any circumstances.
Before we give the second example we make three observations:
Two trivial statements about arbitrage and equilibrium can be stated: in equi-
librium there cannot exist a consumer which has non-positive (negative) transfers,
since 0 ∈ M(x) for any price x. Thus, any arbitrage opportunity must be financed
by other households having positive and negative transfers. This excludes an arbi-
trage opportunity to be exploited in equilibrium when there are only two (types of)
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium in income transfers
agents. Moreover, not all traders can exploit an arbitrage opportunity in equilib-
rium. Thus, someone has to pay for the exploitation of an arbitrage opportunity.
In that sense it is a zero-sum game. Note also, that in any equilibrium it must hold
that4 ri ∈ ∂M , i.e., the income stream chosen in equilibrium by each agent must be
on the boundary of the income stream space. Thus, there cannot exist r′ ∈M such
that r′ > ri. Further, this guarantees the exists of state prices λi ∈ RS+1++ such that
λi · r ≤ λi · ri for every r ∈M .
These results are stated as follows:
Lemma 14 Let (x?, (r?i )i) be a financial equilibrium, then r
?
i /∈ −RS+1+ \ {0}.
Lemma 15 Let (x?, (r?i )i) be a financial equilibrium and I = 2, then r
?
i /∈ RS+1+ .
Lemma 16 Let (x?, (r?i )i) be a financial equilibrium, then for every i there exists
λi ∈ RS+1++ such that λi · (r?i − r) ≥ 0 for every r ∈M(x?).
Example 16 Let there be 3 agents, 2 states and a single consumption good in each
state. To see this, let M ⊂ R2 be the convex set defined as follows:
M = conv{λa+ (1, 1) | a ∈ {(2,−5), (−5, 2)} ∧ λ ≥ 0}.
And consider the income streams r1 = (1, 1), r2 = (3,−4) and r3 = (−4, 3). Then
obviously r1 + r2 + r3 = (0, 0). Take further the (indirect) utility functions to be of
the form vi(r) = ln(r0 + b
i
0) + ln(r1 + b
i
1) for some vector b
i = (bi0, b
i
1) ∈ R2. Choose
4Given a set A, ∂A is the set of boundary points of A, i.e., the set of points x ∈ X such that
any neighbourhood of x intersects with A.
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then (b1, b2, b3) such that
1
1 + b10
− 1
1 + b11
= 0
2
1
3 + b20
− 5 1−4 + b21
= 0
−5 1−4 + b30
+ 2
1
3 + b31
= 0.
This is satisfied when e.g. b1 = (1, 1), b2 = (1, 6), and b3 = (6, 1). Then (r1, r2, r3)
is an equilibrium of the economy (M, (vi)
3
i=1) given above.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.3
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium with an arbitrage opportunity exploited
In the example M is piecewise linear, however we could easily construct it with
a positive curvature, and such that we could construct M with an intermediation
cost function which is strictly convex.
4.4 Intermediation Costs in Portfolios and Income
Streams
This section contains some miscellaneous of topics related to the results and concepts
of sections 4.2 and 4.3.
• How does the concept of intermediation costs of portfolios relate to interme-
diation costs of income streams?
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Let c : RK → R+ be a convex function and denote, for every x ∈ RK , the
dividends of the assets by D(x) ∈ RSK . Define then the income stream set by
M(x) = {r ∈ RS+1 | ∃z ∈ RK : r ≤ (−x · z − c(z), D(x)z)}.
This set is convex: for every r, r′ ∈ M(q) and α ∈ [0, 1] we have that by
convexity of c(·)
αr+(1−α)r′ ≤ (−x ·(αz+(1−α)z′)−c(αz+(1−α)z′), D(x)(αz+(1−α)z′))
where (−x · z¯ − c(z¯), D(x)z¯) ∈M(x) with z¯ = αz + (1− α)z′.
When c(0) = 0, we have that 0 ∈M(x).
If c(z) is the intermediation cost required to obtain a given portfolio, we can
define the intermediation costs required to obtain a given income stream r ∈
RS+1 as the minimum costs of a portfolio that given the gross income stream,
i.e.
c(r;D) = cD(r) = inf{c(z) | r1 ≤ D(x)z ∧ r0 ≤ −x · z − c(z)},
whenever r1 ∈ 〈D〉5, while when r1 /∈ 〈D〉 we let c(r;D) = c(v(r;D);D) where
v(r;D) = arg min{‖r − r˜‖ | r˜ ∈M(x,D)}. The reason why we choose c(r;D)
in this way is to insure continuity of c(·;D) given D.
Note that for every r0 = Dz0, when D has a left-inverse D−1, i.e., if it is one-
to-one, we have that z0 = D−1r0 and we obtain c(r0, D) = c(D−1r0) = c(z0).
Note that the set {z ∈ RK | r1 ≤ D(x)z ∧ r0 ≤ −x · z − c(z)} is convex,
denote it by Z(r0). If c(·) is strictly convex there exists a unique z0 such that
c(r0, D) = c(z0). But then we have that
αc(r;D) + (1− α)c(r′;D) = αc(z) + (1− α)c(z′) ≥ c(αz + (1− α)z′)
≥ c(αr + (1− α)r′;D)
for every z ∈ Z(r) and z′ ∈ Z(r′). Thus, c(·;D) is convex.
Furthermore, obviously it holds that lim‖r‖→∞ c(r;D) =∞.
The question is then whether the map6 c : RS+1×Ω→ R¯+ is7 not continuous?
Let An → A be a convergent sequence of maps An ∈ Ω with 〈An〉 = 〈Am〉 = E
for any n,m while 〈limn→∞An〉 = 〈A〉 6= E. Let then r ∈ E \ 〈A〉 then we
5If D : RJ → RS is a linear map we denote by 〈D〉 the image space, i.e., 〈D〉 = {Dz | z ∈ RJ}.
6Let Ω be the set of linear one-to-one mappings A : RK → RS endowed with the usual metric.
7We denote by R¯+ = R+ ∪ {∞} the extended real line endowed with the one-point-
compactification topology, i.e., the open sets consists of every open set of R+ and all sets of
the form R¯+ \ C for some C ⊂ R+ compact. E.g., (a,∞] is an open set.
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must have that limn→∞ c(r, An) =∞ and also c(r, limn→∞An) = c(r, A) =∞.
Thus, c(·; ·) is continuous.
But then we obtain an income stream correspondence (R,RK) 3 (λ, x) 7→
M(λ, x) by
M(λ, x) = {(−λr0 − c(r;D(x)), r1) | r = (r0, r1) ∈ R× 〈D(x)〉}
which satisfies the conditions of Definition 7.
• The following example illustrates no-arbitrage asset prices when transaction
costs are linear.
Example 17 Whenever c(z) =
∑K
k=1 ak|zk| =
∑K
k=1 ak(z
+
k − z−k ), where z+k =
max{zk, 0} and z−k = max{−zk, 0}, we have an particular simple characteri-
zation of no-arbitrage asset prices, as also shown in [52]. And in such cases,
the existence of an arbitrage opportunity is not consistent with an equilibrium,
because the income space generated is a cone and the result of Proposition 13
applies. In order for x to satisfy the NA condition it must hold that
λ˜ ·Dk − ak ≤ xk ≤ λ˜ ·Dk + ak,
for every k = 1, . . . , K or in vector form
λTD − a ≤ x ≤ λTD + a.
• The next two examples show how we can obtain income stream sets as in
section 4.3 where arbitrage opportunities are present.
Example 18 As a numerical example of an intermediation cost function which
allows arbitrage opportunities is the case where c(z) = az2, where a > 0, and
let ds > 0 be the dividend of the asset. Then any asset price x ∈]−a, 0[ allows
an arbitrage opportunity with z ∈]0,−a
x
[, but there is an asymptotic absence
of a free lunch.
Example 19 Consider the asset structure V =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, the intermedia-
tion cost function c(z) = αz21 + βz
2
2 with α + β < 1 and the asset pricevec-
tor q = (2, 1). Then the portfolio z = (1,−1) generates the income stream
(1 − α − β, 0, 2) ∈ R3+ \ 0. Note also, that lim‖z‖→∞ q · z − αz21 − βz22 = −∞
and hence there is limited arbitrage opportunities.
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• These last examples illustrate an important implication of strictly convex
transaction costs, namely that there always exist asset prices which allows
limited free lunches. We now show this in more general cases.
Let c be a strictly convex intermediation cost function, then there exists some
x0 ∈ RK and z0 ∈ RK such that −λx0 ·z0− c(λz0) > 0 for every 0 < λ < 1 but
−λx0 ·z0−c(λz0) ≤ 0 for every λ ≥ 1: Given a z0 6= 0, the map x 7→ f(x; z0) =
−x · z0 − c(z0) is continuous, supx f(x; z0) = ∞ and infx f(x; z0) = −∞ and
there exists x0 such that f(x0, z0) = 0. By strict convexity of c we have that
c(λz + (1 − λ)z′) < λc(z) + (1 − λ)c(z′) for every λ ∈]0, 1[ and z 6= z′, and
hence c(λz) < λc(z) for every λ < 1 while c(λz) > λc(z) for every λ > 1. By
choosing z0 such that Dz0 > 0 the statement is proved, assuming that such a
portfolio exists. Obviously, the set of such x0 is convex and open. By other
words, for every strictly convex intermediation cost function there is a convex,
open set of asset prices that allows for free lunches but have the absence of
asymptotic free lunches property.
• Finally, we show how to obtain a financial economy as in section 4.2 from a
more general model, as e.g., [18]. A typical economy in the Arrow-Debreu
sense is characterized by the utility functions v over consumption bundles and
the initial endowments of consumption commodities ω. Given a spotmarket
price system (ps)
S
s=0 and a consumption bundle x = (xs)
S
s=0 we obtain a income
stream r = (rs)
S
s=0 given by
rs = ps · (xs − ωs)
for every s = 0, . . . , S. We can thus define the utility of an income stream r,
u(r), as the maximal possible utility obtainable given the prices p, i.e.,
u(r) = max{v(x) | ps · (xs − ωs) ≤ rs∀s}.
If we consider a single-commodity economy then we normalize ps = 1 and we
obtain an utility independent of prices. The properties assumed in section 4.2
are easily shown to be satisfied.
4.5 Conclusion
We have shown that when intermediation or transaction costs are present and they
are convex, then the existence and exploitation of arbitrage opportunities are not
inconsistent with a competitive, symmetric information equilibrium.
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Figure 4.4: Non-convex transaction costs
The question then is of course whether transaction costs have an increasing
marginal cost, or equivalently, a diminishing return in the “production of income
streams”, as implied by the assumption of convex transaction costs.
One argument could be the usual argument that labour has a diminishing return,
in that firms hire the most productive units first and as it employs more labour the
average product then decreases as the new units employed become less productive.
A second argument could be that large quantities of income trade increases the
possibility that the market is thin when the income is traded and thus the price is
unfavourable to the trader.
Note however that an intermediary will not necessarily be hurt by the existence
of arbitrage opportunities since this might increase some of the consumers’ income
trade. But of course also discourage other consumers’ income trade, and the total
effect is ambiguous.
As is shown in [42] in the presence of noise traders the prices deviate, and this
extra cost increases more than proportionally with the trade by any trader. Thus,
any trader is faced with an increasing cost of asset trading in the risky asset.
Note also that “global convexity” is not a necessary condition for this example
to hold, but merely that it is convex “asymptotically”. An example is in figure 4.4.
Here for any portfolio z′ ∈ [z¯, z¯] yields an arbitrage opportunity when dividends
are positive, since −q · z′ > c(z′) > 0. But asymptotically there is an absence of a
free lunch, e.g. when z > z¯. Note also that the costs are concave for small z’s but
become convex for z large.
As one presents examples to illustrate some important and interesting results
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an important question is whether the example is exceptional and are based upon
non-generic parameter values. We claim that the examples given in this paper
are robust wrt. perturbations in the utility functions, and thus the existence of
arbitrage opportunities consistent with equilibrium is a robust property. However,
as was noted in section 4.4 the model does not work in cases where costs are concave,
i.e., where transaction costs have diminishing marginal costs.
The results in this paper suggest a more general result with separated markets:
if the “transportation” costs between two markets are non-linear, arbitrage opportu-
nities, exploited and unexploited, may be consistent with a general equilibrium. The
situation is not only restricted to the case of financial markets, but also consumption
goods are subject to these results.
We note that according to [45] whenever M(·) is generated according to the form
in Section 4.4 there exists an equilibrium. The question is then of course how often
a situation like the example in Section 4.2 occurs? As we see, a necessary condition
is that consumer preferences are sufficiently different.
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Jumps in Asset Prices: A General
Equilibrium Explanation
Tobias Markeprand & Mich Tvede
Abstract. An important question is how incompleteness of the financial markets
affects the pricing of securities and the allocation of real commodities in the econ-
omy. In this paper we show that incompleteness of financial markets can induce
large changes in commodity prices even if the fundamental characteristics do not
change significantly. We show that walrasian equilibria, and thus perfect insurance
opportunities, would eliminate such changes. Thus, our results provide a test with
which incompleteness of markets can be verified. Further, our example exhibit a
continuum of equilibria.
JEL classification:. D50, D52, G12, G14.
Keywords:. General Equilibrium, Incomplete Markets, Asset Pricing.
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5.1 Introduction
A fundamental question is how shocks transmit into the economy and the resulting
allocation and prices. Every day the economy is submitted to shocks influencing the
fundamental characteristics of the state of the economy. You slip in the bathroom
during your morning shower hurting your back, changing your working capabilities;
the frost prevents the train from starting and thereby preventing a load full of pas-
sengers to arrive at their planned destination, etc. The question is then whether
and how all these shocks affect the overall economy and the allocation of resources
in the economy. Obviously, the financial markets are affected by the real economy
in that they determine the inflow of funds and they affect the dividend stream of
many securities. On the other hand, the financial markets affect the real economy
by allowing consumers to reallocate income through time and uncertainty. A fun-
damental principle in finance is that prices are determined by their fundamental
value, i.e., by their future dividend stream. Thus, if the dividends change by a
small amount, so will asset prices. Many asset pricing models assume that divi-
dends follow continuous paths and hence prices should move continuous. However,
these models have difficulties in generating the observed asset prices, in that, among
many things, they fail to account for the “thick tails” in the distribution, i.e., the
overrepresentation of large changes in prices, as expressed by [13]
“In continuous-time setting, jumps in financial prices seem necessary to
account for thick tails in asset returns, and the corresponding implied
volatility smiles in near-maturity options.”
We show how these jumps can be explained by incompleteness of the financial mar-
kets, i.e., by the inability of consumers to save and insure perfectly against shocks.
[55] argues that asset prices fluctuate too much to be explained by the dividends
and hence that the fundamental pricing theory is incorrect. However, we show how
asset prices can exhibit excess volatility due to market incompleteness, while still
maintaining the market efficiency hypothesis.
Why is it important that prices can jump even if the shocks to the economy are
small? This is important since the presence of multiple equilibria is associated with
a coordination problem among market participants. Moreover, our result shows
that these jumps are connected to real jumps and hence have consequences for the
welfare of the households. One can relate this to crashes on the stock exchanges
experienced in Argentina and Russia. Both examples where financial crashes and a
real melt down of the economy happened simultaneously. Furthermore, our example
shows that sudden drops in asset prices are not necessarily evidence that a bubble
has burst, or that a bubble has been present. This makes it even more difficult
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for the monetary authorities to develop tools to remedy bubbles since prices can
change rapidly in a short moment of time, and that they have to be compared with
indicators of real activity such that e.g. GDP or others in order to find out whether
there is a bubble. However, such indicators are only available after the authorities
have to make a decision on whether they should intervene or not.
Furthermore, Our result shows the importance of working with a general equilib-
rium model, taking the interaction between the real economy and financial market
into consideration.
In the present paper we show that incompleteness of financial markets can in-
duce discontinuities in commodity prices as the fundamental characteristics changes.
We show that Walrasian equilibria, and thus perfect insurance opportunities, would
eliminate such changes. Thus, our results provide a test with which incompleteness
of markets can be verified. In order to give content to the phrase “if the funda-
mental characteristics do not change significantly”, we consider a non-atomic state
space, more specifically, a continuum of states. We assume then that fundamentals,
endowments, dividends and densities, are continuous in the states. Furthermore,
we show that with differentiable utilities and real assets there is a continuum of
equilibria, and hence the equilibrium exhibit real indeterminacy. [47] shows how in-
determinacy is a generic phenomenon with real assets and incomplete markets when
there is a finite number of securities and infinite states. More specifically, the result
is as follows, for any real asset there exists an open set of endowments and utility
functions where every element contains an equilibrium set with cardinality equal to
the continuum. Our example confirms his result. Our proofs follow along the lines
of [47] very tightly, in that the continuity property is proved using Pareto efficiency,
while the example also closely relates to his example. However, we focus on the
continuity property of the prices. Our result hinges on the fact that the spotmarket
equilibrium set can have multiple elements, and thus, that the price expectations
must be coordinated given the realization of a future state. Thus, the discontinu-
ity is the result of changing expectations, changes that are not continuous. In the
complete market case, these jumps in expectations are forced to be eliminated since
contracts can be signed which would leave the parties of an exchange better of and
thus prices would change to equilibrate demand and supply.
[6] tells a story to explain the content of the results of analyzing the equilibrium
manifold. It is told that passing through irregular economies could, and must even-
tually, imply a “large” change in commodity prices. This is obviously true in the
case of autarky. We formalize and generalize this story, and we show that in order
for this story to be true, we need incomplete financial markets, so that traders can-
not insure against these changes, since complete markets would prevent such jumps
from occurring. Obviously, risk averse traders would like to insure against such risk.
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A related problem is the upper hemi continuity of the equilibrium correspon-
dence, i.e., the equilibrium prices and allocations parameterized by the endowment.
This property implies that any convergent sequence of endowments must have a
converging sequence of equilibrium states. It is, however, easy to see that the equi-
librium correspondence is upper hemi continuous, and, thus, our result shows that
these questions are independent.
Let us briefly take an overview on how volatility in asset prices has been studied
in a theoretical framework (We apologise for any unjustified omissions)
In the paper [37] it is shown that in a continuous time model of financial pricing
model, prices have continuous sample paths when the information structure is con-
tinuous1 and thus showing that in this model a phenomenon as jumps in asset prices
cannot occur. Among those continuous information structures is the Brownian Mo-
tions. Basically, it is a continuity of the itoˆ parameters which gives the contiunity.
In that sense, our information structure is discontinuous since the time of trade is
discrete. [12] shows that with CARA utility functions interest rates can fluctuate
over time, but not over states since there are idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate
certainty. Also, he shows that there is a unique equilibrium. [13] incorporate jumps
in the drift and volatility components of the dividend process and they take a sta-
tistical approach to the asset pricing. They use a so-called multifractal model which
diverges from the normal Gaussian model by allowing jumps in the drift and volatil-
ity of the dividend processes, i.e., the itoˆ parameters. However, they do not explain
these jumps, while our jumps are perfectly endogenous. [26] shows by means of an
example that incompleteness of the markets can induce increased volatility on the
prices on durable commodities. He considers a model of asset market which endog-
enize the default rate and the level of collateral. The use of durable commodities as
collateral tends to increase the demand for these commodities and hence increase the
price. Again, a general equilibrium model is required for this result, since commodi-
ties through collateralization is tied up together. Thus, the price of one commodity
affects the other commodities as well. The paper [17] studies volatility of security
prices and financial innovation. Their results point in two directions, depending on
the nature of risk, more specifically whether there is aggregate risk or not. When
there is no aggregate risk, completing the asset market will generically reduce the
asset price volatility. While in the case of aggregate risk, reducing the degree of
incompleteness per se is not necessarily associated with a volatility reduction. We
take the financial structure as exogenous. The paper [36] shows that the equilibrium
price has a continuous density. However, we provide a different proof of this result,
as we exploit the relationship between Pareto efficiency and Walrasian equilibria
1Inforamlly, an information structure is continuous if the induced conditional probabilities is
continuous, i.e., the map t 7→ P (B | Ft) is continuous.
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given by the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Our results moreover
show that the continuity property is intimately related to the efficiency property,
since any such allocation must be continuous.
Finally, let us just state some remarks on our indeterminacy result. In [19] it
is shown that with complete markets, generically, there is a finite set of equilibria,
while in [8], [27] it is shown that with real assets and a finite set of states of nature
there is generically a finite set of equilibria. In the other extreme, with nominal
securities [7] shows that the indeterminacy is large and calculates the dimension of
indeterminacy to be of the difference between the number of states and securities.
Our example shows that the result of determinacy with real assets and finite states
does not extend to the case of a continuum of states. We have not shown that our
example is robust, however we claim without any proof that it is actually robust.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 5.2 we introduce notation and
the equilibrium concepts, and further state our assumptions on the fundamental
characteristics of the economy. Then in section 5.3 we state and prove that with
complete markets the prices are continuous in states, and in section 5.4 an example
illustrates that asset prices can have jumps when the asset market is incomplete
with finitely many securities. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The model
Set-up
There is a finite number T +1 of dates with t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. There is uncertainty, the
set of states at date t ≥ 1 is S = [0, 1] with s ∈ S and pi : ST → R+ is the density
on the set of states ST . There is a finite number of goods ` at every state with
j ∈ {1, . . . , `}. A collection of maps p = (pt), where pt : St → R`++, is a price system
for goods. The space ST is endowed with the σ-algebra induced by the density pi.
There is a finite number m of consumers with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Consumers are
described by their identical consumption sets X = (R`++)T+1, endowments ωi =
(ωti)t, where endowments at date t is described by a map ω
t
i : S
t → X, and state
utility function ui : X → R. A collection of maps xi = (xti)t, where xti : St → R`++,
is a consumption bundle. An allocation of goods x = (xi)i is a list of individual
consumption bundles.
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Walras equilibrium
Let st = (s1, . . . , st) denote the history of states to date t, then the problem of
consumer i is:
max
xi
∫
ST
u(x0i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T )) pi(sT ) dsT
s.t.
∫
ST
∑
t
pt(s
t) · xti(st) dsT ≤
∫
ST
∑
t
pt(s
t) · ωti(st) dsT
Please note that the problem of consumer i may not have a solution because none
of the integrals may be defined. For now it is hoped that informally the problem
makes sense.
Definition 1 A Walrasian equilibrium is a price system for goods and an allo-
cation of goods (p¯, x¯) such that:
• x¯i is a solution to the problem of consumer i for all i, and;
• markets clear ∑i x¯ti(st) = ∑i ωti(st) for all t and st.
Financial market equilibrium
There is a finite number n of assets with k ∈ {1, . . . , n} where the dividend of asset
k at date t is described by a map atk : S
t+1 → R`. A collection of maps q = (qt),
where qt : S
t → Rn, is a price system for assets. A collection of maps zi = (zti)t,
where zti : S
t → Rk, is portfolio plan. An allocation of assets z = (zi) is a list of
portfolio plans. Portfolios are restricted to be in Z where Z ⊂ Rn is convex and
closed.
A price system (p, q) is a price system for goods and a price system for assets.
An allocation (x, z) is an allocation of goods and an allocation of assets.
Let at(s
t) be the ` × n-matrix of dividends (a1t (st) . . . ant (sT )) at date t in state
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st, then the problem of consumer i is:
max
(xi,zi)
∫
ST
u(x0i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T )) pi(sT ) dsT
s.t.

p0 · x0i + z0i · q0 ≤ p0 · ω0i
pt(s
t) · xti(st) + zti(st) · qt(st)
≤ pt(st) · ωti(st) + zt−1i (st−1) · (qt(st) + pt(st)at(st))
for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}
pT (s
T ) · xTi (sT ) ≤ pT (sT ) · ωTi (sT ) + zt−1i (sT ) · (pT (sT )aT (sT ))
zti(s
t) ∈ Z for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}
Definition 2 A financial market equilibrium is a price system and an allocation
((p¯, q¯), (x¯, z¯)) such that:
• (x¯i, z¯i) is a solution to the problem of consumer i for all i, and;
• market clears ∑i x¯ti(st) = ∑i ωti(st) and ∑i z¯ti(st) = 0 for all t and st.
Assumptions
The consumers are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.1) ωti ∈ C1([0, 1]t, X).
(A.2) ui ∈ C2(X,R) with Dui(xi) ∈ R`T++ for all xi and vTD2ui(xi)v < 0 for all xi
and v 6= 0.
(A.3) If xi → xˆi and xˆi ∈ ∂X, then ‖Dui(xi)‖ → ∞.
The economy is supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.4) pi ∈ C1([0, 1]T ,R++).
(A.5) atk ∈ C1([0, 1]t,R`) for all k and t.
All the allocations and prices are of course assumed to be measurable wrt. the
σ-algebra on ST induced by pi. Moreover, we assume that allocations are uniformly
bounded, i.e., they are elements of L∞. When we consider Walrasian equilibria we
assume that prices are elements of L1, i.e., they are µ-integrable. In the next section,
however, we show that more is true, namely that they are continuous.
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5.3 Complete financial markets
In the present paper functions that are identical except for a set of measure zero are
considered to be identical.
Definition 3 A measurable function f : ST → R is continuous at sˆT if and only
if there exist a neighborhood A of sˆT and a function g : ST → R, where g−1(B) is
open for B open, such that∫
A
1{sT |f(sT )6=g(sT )} pi(s
T ) dsT = 0.
A function is continuous if and only if it is continuous at all points.
Walrasian equilibrium
At Walrasian equilibria, prices and consumption bundles are differentiable functions
of states of nature. The proof consists of two steps: in Lemma 1 it is shown that
prices and consumption bundles are continuous functions of states, and; in Theorem
1 it is shown that they are continuous functions of states, then they are differentiable
functions of states.
Lemma 1 Suppose that (p¯, x¯) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then it is continuous in
sT .
In [9] it its shown under which conditions prices are integrable, and not only
representable as abstract functionals on the commodity space, i.e., (L∞)? = ba which
is the set of bounded additive set functions absolutely continuous with respect to µ.
Proof: Suppose that (p¯, x¯) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then there exists λ1, . . . , λm >
0 such that x¯ is the solution to the following problem
max
x
∑
i
λi
∫
ui(x
0
i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T )) pi(sT ) dsT
s.t.
∑
i
xti(s
t) =
∑
i
ωti(s
t) for all t and st
(5.1)
The proof that x¯ is continuous in sT is by backward induction on t.
“t = T” Suppose that cˆT−1 = (xˆ0, . . . , xˆT−1) and sˆT are fixed and consider the
following maximization problem
max
xT
∑
i
λiui(cˆ
T−1
i , x
T
i )
s.t.
∑
i
xTi =
∑
i
ωTi (sˆ
T ).
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Then for every cˆT−1 and sˆT there exists a unique continuous solution to the maxi-
mization problem according to assumptions (A.2) and (A.3). Let fT : (Xm)T×ST →
Xm be the solution, then it is continuous according to Berge’s maximum theorem
and if cT−1 = (x¯0(s0), . . . , x¯T−1(sT−1)), then fT (cT−1, sT ) = x¯T (sT ). Moreover the
function vTi : (X
m)T × ST → R defined by
vTi (c
T−1, sT−1) =
∫
ui(c
T−1
i , f
T
i (c
T−1, sT )) pi(sT |sT−1) dsT
is strictly concave in x0, . . . , xT−1.
“t = T − 1” Suppose that cˆT−2 = (xˆ0, . . . , xˆT−2) and sˆT−1 are fixed and consider
the following maximization problem
max
xT−1
∑
i
λivi(cˆ
T−2, xT−1, sˆT−1)
s.t.
∑
i
xT−1i =
∑
i
ωT−1i (sˆ
T−1).
Then for every cˆT−2 and sˆT−1 there exists a unique continuous solution to the maxi-
mization problem according to assumptions (A.2) and (A.3). Let fT−1 : (Xm)T−1×
ST−1 → Xm be the solution, then it is continuous according to Berge’s max-
imum theorem and if cT−2 = (x¯0(s0), . . . , x¯T−2(sT−2)), then fT−1(cT−2, sT−1) =
x¯T−1(sT−1). Moreover the function vT−1i : (X
m)T−1 × ST−1 → R defined by
vT−1i (c
T−2, sT−1)
=
∫
vTi (c
T−2, fT−1(cT−2, sT−1), sT−1) pi(sT−1|sT−2) dsT−1
is strictly concave in cT−2.
The steps for t = T − 2, . . . , 0 are similar to the step for t = T − 1. The solution
(x¯t)t, where x¯t : S
t → Xm, to problem (5.1) is defined as follows
x¯0 = f 0
x¯1(s1) = f 1(x¯0, s1)
...
x¯T−1(sT−1) = fT−1(x¯0, x¯1(s1), . . . , x¯T−2(sT−2), sT−1)
x¯T (sT ) = fT (x¯0, x¯1(s1), . . . , x¯T−1(sT−1), sT ).
The price system p¯ is collinear with the gradients of the consumers, so the price
system is continuous in sT too. Indeed there exists τ > 0 such that
p¯t(s
t) = τλi
∫
Dxtui(x¯i(s
T )) pi(st+1, . . . , sT |st) d(st+1, . . . , sT ).
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for all i, t and st.

Remark: In the proof of Lemma 1 it is only used that utility functions are once
differentiable and strictly concave, but it is not used that utility functions are twice
differentiable with negative definite Hessian matrices.
End of remark
Theorem 1 Suppose that (p¯, x¯) is a Walrasian equilibrium. Then (p¯, x¯) is differ-
entiable in sT .
Proof: Suppose that (p¯, x¯) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then according to Lemma 1
it is continuous in sT and there exists λ1, . . . , λm > 0 such that x¯ is the solution to
the following problem
max
x
∑
i
λi
∫
ui(x
0
i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T )) pi(sT ) dsT
s.t.
∑
i
xti(s
t) =
∑
i
ωti(s
t) for all t and st.
The proof that x¯ is differentiable in sT is by induction on t. At step t it is assumed
that x0 is differentiable in s0,. . . , xt−1 is differentiable in st−1.
“t = 0” The first-order conditions with respect to x0 at s0 are
λi
∫
Dx0ui(x
0
i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T )) pi(sT ) dsT − α0 = 0 for all i∑
i
x0i −
∑
i
ω0i = 0
The `(m + 1) × `(m − 1)-matrix H of derivatives with respect to x0 and α0 of the
first-order conditions is 
D01 −I
. . .
...
D0m −I
I · · · I

where D0i is a `× `-matrix defined by
D0i = λi
∫
D2x0x0ui(x
0
i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T )) pi(sT ) dsT
and I is a the `×`-identity matrix. The matrix of derivatives with respect to x0 and
α0 of the first-order conditions has full rank. Therefore according to the Implicit
Function Theorem x0 is a differentiable function of s0, because x1 is a continuous
function of s1,. . . , xT is a continuous function of sT .
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“t = T” The first-order conditions with respect to xT at sT are
λiDxTui(x
0
i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T ))− αT = 0 for all i∑
i
xTi (s
T )−
∑
i
ωTi (s
T ) = 0
The `(m + 1) × `(m − 1)-matrix H of derivatives with respect to x1 and α1 of the
first-order conditions is 
DT1 −I
. . .
...
DTm −I
I · · · I

where DTi is a `× `-matrix defined by
DTi = λiD
2
xT xTui(x
0
i , . . . , x
T
i (s
T )).
The matrix of derivatives with respect to x1 and α1 of the first-order conditions has
full rank. Therefore according to the Implicit Function Theorem xT is a differentiable
function of sT , because x0 is a differentiable function of s0,. . . , xT−1 is a differentiable
function of sT−1.
The fact that p¯ is differentiable in sT follows from the proof that p¯ is continuous
in sT in the proof of Lemma 1 and that x¯ is differentiable in sT .

Financial market equilibrium
At financial market equilibria, where the allocation is Pareto optimal, prices includ-
ing asset prices, consumption bundles and portfolios are differentiable functions of
states.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (p¯, x¯) is a Walrasian equilibrium and a = (ak)k, where
ak = (a
t
k)t and a
t
k : S
t → R`, is an asset structure such that ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, z¯)) is a
financial market equilibrium. Then q¯ is differentiable in sT .
Proof: The proof that q¯ is differentiable in sT is by backward induction on t.
“t = T − 1” The asset price of asset k at date T − 1 in state sT−1 is
q¯T−1k (s
T−1) =
∫
p¯T (s
T−1, sT ) · aTk (sT−1, sT ) dsT
where p¯T is continuous in s
T according to Lemma 1 and aTk is continuous in s
T
according to assumption (A.5). Therefore q¯T−1k is continuous in s
T−1.
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“t = 0” Trivial because q¯0k is a number rather than a function. However the asset
price of asset k at date 0 is
q¯0k =
∫
(p¯1(s1) · a1k(s1) + q1k(s1)) ds1
where p¯1 is continuous in s
1 according to Lemma 1 and a1k is continuous in s
1
according to assumption (A.5). Therefore q¯0k is continuous.

Remark: In the proof of Corollary 1 it is only used that (p¯, x¯) is continuous and that
a is continuous, but it is not used that a is differentiable.
End of remark
5.4 Incomplete financial markets
Financial market equilibrium
At financial market equilibria there may be jumps in prices including asset prices,
consumption bundles and portfolios. The proof is based on an example.
Theorem 2 There exists an economy such that if ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, z¯)) is a financial market
equilibrium, then q¯ is not continuous in sT .
Proof: Consider an economy with three dates T = 2, one good per state ` = 1, two
consumers m = 2, one asset n = 1 and Z = R. We let S = [0, 1] be the set of
states. The dividend of the asset is supposed to be one unit of the good at the last
date. Endowments and asset dividends are supposed to independent of the state at
the first and last date. For the density pi : S → R++ suppose that pi(s1) = 1 for
all s1 ∈ S. The information algebra is such that the information set at t = 0 is
F0 = {∅, S} and finally, the σ-algebra generated by F1 = F2 = {{s} | s ∈ S}.
Endowments at the first date are supposed to be identical ω02 = ω
0
1 and endow-
ments at the last two dates are supposed to be reverse ω12(s1) = ω
2
1(1 − s1) and
ω22(s1) = ω
1
1(1− s1). Similarly, utility functions are supposed to be identical for the
first date and reverse for the last two dates u2(x
0, x1, x2) = u1(x
0, x2, x1).
For c0i let f(·; c0i ) : R2++ × R++ → R2++ denote the demand function for the
consumer with endowments ei(s1) = (ω
1
i (s1), ω
2
i (s1)) and utility function vi(·; c0i ) :
R2++ → R defined by vi(x1i , x2i ; c0i ) = ui(c0i , x1i , x2i ). Then (p, s1) ∈ R2×R2++×S is an
equilibrium for the Edgeworth box economy E(s1; (c0i )i) = (ei(s1), vi(·, ; c0i ))i if and
only if
f1(p, p · e1(s1); c01) + f2(p, p · e2(s1); c02) = e1(s1) + e2(s1)
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Clearly (p1, p2, s1) is an equilibrium for E(s1; (c0i )i) if and only if (p2, p1, 1− s1) is an
equilibrium for E(s1; (d0i )i), where d01 = c02 and d02 = c01.
Suppose that equilibrium prices are normalized such that the sum of the prices
is equal to one and let E ⊂ R2++ × S be the equilibrium set for the collection of
Edgeworth economies (E(s1; (c0i )i)s1 , where c0i = ω0i (s0), so
E = { (p, s1) | (p, s1; (c0i )i) is an equilibrium for E(s1; (c0i ))}.
Suppose that E is S-shaped as shown in Figure 5.1 and let r : S → R2++ be a
selection from E such that r1(s1) is the lowest equilibrium price for s1 < 1/2, r1(s1) =
(1/2, 1/2) for s1 = 1/2 and r1(s1) is the highest equilibrium price for s1 > 1/2. In
Figure 5.1: The equilibrium set E.
order to construct a financial market equilibrium: let the allocation x be defined
by x0i = ω
0
i , x
j
i (s1) = f
j
i (r(s1), ei(s1);ω
0
i ) for j ∈ {1, 2}; let the portfolio plan z
be defined by z0i = 0 and z
1
i (s1) = (r1(s1)/r2(s1))(ω
1
i (s1) − f 1i (r(s1), ei(s1);ω0i )) =
f 2i (r(s1), ei(s1);ω
0
i )− ω2i (s1); let the price system p be defined by p2(s2) = p1(s1) =
p0(s0) = 1, and; let the price system for assets q be defined by q
1(s1) = r2(s
1)/r1(s
1)
and q0 > 0 such that∫ (
−q0∂ui(xi(s1))
∂x0i
+ q1(s1)
∂ui(xi(s1))
∂x1i
)
ds1 = 0.
Then ((p, q), (x, z)) is a financial market equilibrium and the asset price at date 1 is
discontinuous at s1 = 1/2.
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Finally, We note that the portfolio z01 of consumer 1 at date 0 is bounded from
below by
z = −min
s1
ω11(s1) + q
1(s1)ω
2
1(s1)
q1(s1)
and from above by
z = min
s1
ω12(s1) + q
1(s1)ω
2
2(s1)
q1(s1)
,
i.e., z ≤ z01(s1) ≤ z for every s1 ∈ S. When ‖(ω11(s1), ω21(s1))‖ is bounded from
above by M > 0 for s1 ∈ [0, 1] and the marginal rates of substitution at the Pareto
optimal allocations in the economies E(s1) for s1 ∈ [0, 1] are bounded away from
zero and infinity, then for M sufficiently small, the set of equilibria for the collection
of economies {E(s1)} is S-shaped for all feasible portfolios so there is a discontinuity
in prices.

Remark: The proof of Theorem 2 reveals that any measurable selection r : S → R2++
such that r1(s1) = 1 − r1(1 − s1) and r2(s1) = 1 − r2(1 − s1) is part of a financial
market equilibrium. Therefore as shown in [47] there is a continuum of financial
market equilibria.
End of remark
On the example in the proof of Theorem 2
Let us try, informally, to argue that the example in the proof of Theorem 2 is
robust. In order to consider pertubations of fundamentals suppose that the set of
fundamentals is endowed with the Whitney topology, endowments and dividends
with the C1-topology and utility functions with the C2-topology.
The S-shape of the equilibrium set E is robust to perturbations in fundamentals
and small changes in portfolios. Therefore every selection from the equilibrium set is
discontinuous. Hence assets prices are discontinuous. The robustness of the example
in the proof of Theorem 2 shows that the symmetry in the example is not essential,
but merely convenient.
5.5 Final remarks
In the present paper we have shown, admittedly by use of an example, that jumps
in asset prices are possible in case of incomplete financial markets. Moreover, we
have shown that jumps are impossible in case of complete financial markets. Our
results show that with incomplete financial markets on the one hand consumers are
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not able to insure themselves against all uncertainty and on the other hand induce
price effects such as jumps in asset prices.
From a finance perspective it would be interesting to calibrate a parametric
model such as an optimal growth model or an overlapping generations model to see
whether jumps in asset prices are compatible with data.
From a general equilibrium perspective a partial answer to the question of the
appropriate commodity for economies with infinite dimensional commodity spaces.
Indeed we have shown that for Walrasian economies restricting attention to contin-
uous maps on the underlying state space as in [16] is no real restriction.
One might argue that such jumps as are observed in real life are abrupt changes
of prices over time, and they are not easily studied in a model with discrete time.
However, one might conjecture that our model could be transformed into a model of
continuous time, by utilizing the fact that we have a continuum of states. One could
argue as follows2: interpret the states as the time between the two periods and let
there be no uncertainty. Let there be a single asset. If there is no boundary on short
sale, the asset market is complete and our first result applies. However, introducing
short-sale boundaries income transfers becomes limited and the S-shaped curve in
the example re-emerges. Then as time passes by the asset price must jump.
2This is an interpretation attributed to Yves Balasko, in a conversation with one of the authors.
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Existence of finite horizon
equilibrium
We need to extend the result of [45] to the case of multiple periods: Again, let Y be
finite and let T <∞ be the number of periods, then the state space is Ω = Y T and
the probability of a state s = (s1, . . . , sT ) is given by P (s) = pi(s1, s2)·· · ··pi(sT−1, sT ).
Let (Dt)Tt=1 be a finite sequence of partitions of Ω, wlog. {Ω} = D1 ⊂ D2 ⊂ · · · ⊂
DT−1 ⊂ DT =
⋃
ω∈Ω{ω}.
A process (Rm-valued) is a finite sequence (xt)Tt=1 such that xt : Ω → Rm is
Dt-measurable, i.e., for every U ⊂ Rm open and every t = 1, . . . , T , x−1t (U) is
measurable wrt. σ(Dt)1. This implies that xt(ω) = xt(ω′) whenever there exists
Q ∈ Dt such that ω, ω′ ∈ Q. This follows since any σ(Dt)-measurable set E is
the union of atoms from Dt. Assume that there exists Q ∈ Dt, ω, ω′ ∈ Q and
xt(ω) 6= xt(ω′). Then take open disjoint sets U, V ⊂ Rm, xt(ω) ∈ U and xt(ω′) ∈ V .
But then x−1t (U \ V ) = x−1t (U) \ x−1t (V ) which is not a union of atoms of Dt since
ω ∈ x−1t (U) \ x−1t (V ) but ω′ /∈ x−1t (U) \ x−1t (V ).
Denote by L the set of consumption processes (Rl-valued) and Θ the set of
portfolio processes (Rk-valued). An allocation is a process (x, θ) ∈ (L × Θ)n such
that ∑
i
xit(ω)− eit(ω) = 0∑
i
θit(ω) = 0
P -a.e., i.e., for a subset E ⊂ Ω with P (E) = 1. A commodity pricevector is a process
p ∈ L+ and an asset pricevector is a process q ∈ Θ. We say that (x, θ) ∈ L × Θ is
1Where σ(Dt) is the σ-algebra generated by Dt, i.e., the smallest σ-algebra containing Dt. Since
Dt is a partition this makes σ(Dt) particular simple, since if A,B ∈ Dt then either A ∩ B = ∅ or
A = B, and thus any set E ∈ σ(Dt) is of the form E =
⋃
D∈D D where D ⊂ Dt.
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feasible if
p0 · (x0 − ei0) + q0 · θ0 ≤ wi0 − c(θ0)
and for every t = 1, . . . , T
pt(ω) · (xt(ω)− et(ω)) + qt(ω) · θt(ω) ≤ D(ω) · θt−1(ω) + wt(ω)− c(θt(ω))
P -a.e. Denote by B(p, q, w) the set of feasible policies given the price processes
(pt, qt)
T
t=1 and transfer process (wt)
T
t=1.
A T -horizon equilibrium is then a finite sequence (st)
T
t=0 with S-values such that
for every i the strategy (xit, θit)
T
t=0 is optimal.
Proposition 20 For any T there exists a T -horizon equilibrium.
The difficult part of the result is to show that the budget constraint is lower hemi-
continuous. Note first that since pt·et > 0 and wt ≥ 0 the Slater condition is satisfied;
i.e., that there exists a strategy (xt, θt) such that the inequalities are all satisfied
with strict inequalities. Let (pn, qn, wn)→ (p, q, w) and consider (x, θ) ∈ B(p, q, w).
The desired sequence (xn, θn) ∈ B(pn, qn, wn) is obtained using the method of
forward induction: first solve t = 0 and obtain (xn0 , θ
n
0 ), then given this solution let
ηn1 =
pn1 · e1 +Dn(qn) · θn0 + wn1
pn1 · x1 + qn1 · θ1 + c(θ1)
,
when n is large enough (since this guarantee that the fraction is well-defined). Ob-
viously, 0 ≤ ηn ≤ 1 and lim ηn1 = 1 and thus, the sequence (xn1 , θn1 ) = (ηn1x1, ηn1 θ1)
satisfies the required properties. Assume that (ητ )
t−1
τ=0 is constructed such that
(xnτ , θ
n
τ ) = η
n
τ (xτ , θτ ) for any τ ≤ t − 1 and n ∈ Z0. Then we define ηnt using
the formula
ηnt =
pnt · e(yt) +Dnt · θnt−1 + wnt
pnt · xt + qnt · θt + c(θt)
.
Using this algorithm, we obtain the desired sequence (xn, θn) = (xnt , θ
n
t )
T
t=0.
We note that we have showed the existence of a spotless equilibrium, since the
endogenous variables only depend on the fundamental states given by Ω.
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